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WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT 
TAX EXEMPTION 
Philip T. Hackney* 
Certain nonprofit organizations are granted exemption from federal 
income   tax   (“tax   exemption”).   Most   theories   assume   tax   exemption is a 
subsidy for organizations such as charities that provide some 
underprovided good or service. To make the subsidy case, these theories 
assume that there should be a tax on nonprofit organization income but 
provide no justification for this assumption. This article contributes to the 
literature by considering corporate income tax rationales as a proxy for 
why we might tax nonprofit organizations. The primary two corporate tax 
theories hold that the corporate tax is imposed to: (1) tax shareholders 
(“shareholder   theory”),   and   (2)   regulate   corporate manager control over 
large   sources   of  wealth   (“regulatory   theory”).   The   article   concludes   that  
under the shareholder theory, tax exemption for charitable organizations is 
not a subsidy because such organizations have no shareholders to tax. 
Nonetheless, tax exemption for mutual benefit organizations such as 
business leagues qualifies as a subsidy because their members are arguably 
the equivalent of shareholders. Adopting the regulatory theory suggests tax 
exemption is a subsidy for all tax exempt organizations, as this rationale 
should apply to any tax exempt organization with the potential to amass 
significant wealth. Adopting this theory also suggests that to exempt an 
organization from income tax is to exempt that organization from a 
regulatory regime. Tax exempt organizations, however, become subject to 
federal oversight of political activity and self-dealing transactions. This 
article considers whether this separate regulatory regime is a sufficient 
substitute. While this article concludes that the charitable organization 
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regulatory regime is a sufficient substitute for the corporate income tax, it 
also concludes that the regulatory regime for mutual benefits is lacking. 
This article proposes that it is time to revamp our tax exempt structure for 
mutual benefit organizations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organizations carry on economic activity within and without 
our country like many other legally recognized entities that are required to 
pay tax; nonprofit organizations, however, are generally exempted from 
paying income tax.1 Most theories assume tax exemption, most typically 
from the corporate income tax,2 is a subsidy for nonprofit organizations that 
provide some good or service that benefits society or is otherwise under-
produced.3 The subsidy presumption, however, is not grounded in a 
 
 1 Specifically, organizations exempted from the federal income tax under section 
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) include charitable organizations, social welfare 
organizations, labor organizations, business leagues, social clubs, and many others. This 
exemption is not the same as the charitable contribution deduction under section 170, which 
is a separate and distinct issue that is available as a benefit to only a few of the organizations 
that are exempt from tax under section 501(a). Although generally an organization exempt 
under section 501(a) is not required to pay a tax on its income, if it carries on a trade or 
business unrelated to its exempt purpose it must pay the unrelated business income tax under 
section 511. 
 2 Most nonprofits exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) are formed as 
corporations. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 38 (3d ed. 2010). The Code imposes a tax on the income of these nonprofit 
organizations formed as corporations under section 11. Of course, exemption under section 
501(a) is used to ensure exemption in a sense from the individual income tax as well under 
section 1, as income earned in any activity could be attributed to an individual if that 
individual does not have some credible claim that the income is associated with some entity 
that is recognized for tax purposes. Some nonprofit organizations exempt under section 
501(a) might be established as trusts (and become exempt from tax under subchapter J), 
organized as cooperatives (and become exempt from tax under subchapter T), or organized 
as unincorporated associations (and treated as corporations under section 7701). 
 3 See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt 
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011); Rob Atkinson, Altruism 
in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990) [hereinafter Altruism]; Rob 
Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and 
Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997) [hereinafter Theories of Exemption]; Boris I. 
Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: 
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rationale for why we would tax the income of nonprofit organizations in the 
first place. The subsidy rationale requires that in a normal income tax we 
believe that an income tax should apply to these organizations. The subsidy 
only results because the government forgoes tax revenue. This article 
reframes the tax exemption rationale debate by considering the rationales 
for imposing a corporate tax in our income tax system as a proxy for why 
we might tax nonprofit entities. Focusing on the two major rationales of the 
corporate   tax,   (1)   to   tax   shareholders   (“shareholder   theory”),   and   (2)   to  
regulate corporate manager control over large sources of wealth 
(“regulatory   theory”),   this   article   examines   the   implications of those 
theories for tax exemption. This article concludes that the corporate tax 
rationale implications generally suggest that we have little rationale for 
applying a corporate tax on the charitable activities of charitable 
organizations; however, it recommends reconsidering tax exemption for 
mutual benefit organizations such as social welfare organizations and 
business leagues. The two primary rationales for imposing the corporate 
income tax apply most specifically to the activities of mutual benefit 
organizations. 
Adopting the shareholder theory as a base for why we would tax a 
nonprofit organization supports tax exemption for organizations without 
shareholders. In fact, because charitable organizations have no 
shareholders, this article argues that tax exemption is not a subsidy for such 
organizations. On the other hand, mutual benefit organizations are operated 
for the benefit of specific individuals or entities controlling the actions of 
the organization through voting, i.e., mutual benefits arguably have 
individuals akin to shareholders. Thus, under the shareholder theory, 
because   a   tax   would   normally   apply   to   a   mutual   benefit’s   income,   tax  
exemption is a subsidy to mutual benefits. There are, as yet, no robust 
arguments setting forth a positive rationale warranting the tax exemption of 
 
Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Nina J. Crimm, An 
Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory 
of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The 
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991) [hereinafter Nonprofit Hospitals]; Mark A. Hall & John D. 
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 
(1991) [hereinafter Donative Theory]; Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011) [hereinafter Exemptions a Subsidy]; Daniel 
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133 (2006) [hereinafter 
Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits]; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit 
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Lawrence M. 
Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a 
National Policy, 20 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 27 (1968). 
HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5 9/9/2013  4:11 PM 
2013] What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption 105 
the vast majority of mutual benefits.4 
Adopting the regulatory theory as a rationale for taxing corporate 
entities supports a conclusion that tax exemption is a subsidy for all tax 
exempt organizations, as by its terms the theory should apply to any 
organization controlled by managers that might control significant sources 
of wealth and over whom there is little oversight from owners. The 
nonprofit sector by definition has weak ownership oversight. Nevertheless, 
viewing tax exemption from the regulatory theory highlights that exempting 
an organization from the corporate income tax exempts that organization 
from a form of regulation. Tax exempt organizations become subject to a 
new regulatory regime that limits political activity and self-dealing.5 This 
article examines the impact of this substitution of regulatory regime; it 
concludes the regulatory regime imposed on charitable organizations is 
sufficient, but contends that the regulatory regime for mutual benefits is 
lacking. This article suggests it is time to revamp our tax exempt structure 
for mutual benefit tax exempt organizations. 
Mutual benefit organizations such as business leagues and social 
welfare organizations are often used to impact the political process.6 The 
modern conception of the regulatory function suggests that the corporate 
tax serves to reign in the political strength of corporate managers and to 
direct managers towards using the assets of the corporation for more 
socially desirable purposes.7 While the regulatory function of the corporate 
tax is perhaps controversial,8 there can be no doubt that exempting an 
 
 4 But cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring)   (describing   the  “role  played  by   tax  exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed 
often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints.”);; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3 
(suggesting that some of the efforts of mutual benefits might be justifiable as exempt on the 
theory that they might do the activity itself on their own without having to pay a tax); 
Hansmann, supra note 3. Developing a theory of subsidizing the most efficient provider of a 
service, described below in Part II, could potentially support some mutual benefits, though 
Hansmann noted at least its inapplicability in the case of social clubs. Id.  
 5 Tax exempt organizations are subject to a regulatory regime under the Code. Among 
other things, these organizations must annually comply with the requirements for qualifying 
under section 501(c), and almost all of them must file an information return under section 
6033, disclosing a significant amount of information regarding their activities each year. 
They must make the information available to the public. Additionally there are prohibitions 
on their involvement with the political process. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 6 See, e.g., Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it 
Public Welfare, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:25 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/ 
how-nonprofits-spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare. 
 7 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1211–12 (2004). 
 8 See, e.g., STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT XVII (2010). 
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organization from the tax limits the power of Congress over the 
organization. For instance, Congress loses the ability to provide incentives 
to tax exempt organizations through deductions from taxes. Congress has 
responded in part to this need for a regulatory function over tax exempt 
entities by limiting in part the political activities of exempt organizations 
through prohibitions,9 imposing public disclosure requirements,10 and 
applying some taxes.11 This article contends those efforts do not go far 
enough for mutual benefit organizations. It proposes imposing a greater tax 
burden on mutual benefit organizations, such as requiring them to pay a tax 
on their investment income, to both properly apply a tax burden on 
individuals who are shareholders and to properly tax the fullness of the 
political activities of these organizations. 
The recent scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service (Service) 
exempt organizations division allegedly targeting Tea Party applicants for 
extra scrutiny for tax exempt status12 also suggests a strong need for a 
rethinking of our tax exemption system for mutual benefit tax exempt 
organizations. The Tea Party organizations primarily appear to have sought 
status as social welfare organizations under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code), a type of organization that arguably fits under the 
mutual benefit organization rubric; such organizations tend to be more 
focused on member interests than they are in fulfilling some public need. 
Social welfare organizations are allowed to intervene in a political 
campaign   as   long   as   that   is   not   the   organization’s   primary purpose.13 
Determining  whether  a  social  welfare  organization’s  primary  purpose  is  not  
political turns out to be a challenging exercise, as the Tea Party scandal 
clearly illuminates.14 If we were to impose a net-investment income tax on 
 
 9 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (limiting charitable organizations from intervening in a 
political campaign or engaging in lobbying that is more than a substantial part of its 
activities). 
 10 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6033 (requiring organizations to file an annual return, made 
publicly available, supplying substantial information regarding the activity of tax exempt 
organizations). 
 11 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 527, 4911. 
 12 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, REF. NO. 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX 
EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013). 
 13 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a) (as amended in 1990). 
 14 See, e.g., Stephen Ohlemacher, Holly Paz, IRS Supervisor, Admits Scrutinizing 
Applications From Tea Party Groups, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2013, 8:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/16/irs-scandal-holly-paz-tea-party-applications_ 
n_3451684.html (quoting a statement Holly Paz, then Director of the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (Service) Rulings and Agreements division, made to investigators: “[The 501(c)(4) 
political determination is] very fact-and-circumstance intensive. So  it’s  a  difficult  issue.”). 
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all mutual benefit organizations, as this article proposes, we would take a 
great deal of pressure off of the Service in making this political call. 
Additionally, requiring public disclosure of donors to most mutual benefit 
tax exempt organizations would be a beneficial move to make the 
requirements for such potentially politically active organizations more in 
line with the requirements of a section 527 political organization that 
already lives under such a requirement.15  
Our tax system employs a number of different forms of taxation for 
various legal entities, such as trusts,16 cooperatives,17 partnerships,18 and a 
host of special industry taxation systems such as insurance and banking.19 
Thus, in considering a basis for imposing an income tax on a nonprofit 
organization, one might begin by asking: why focus on corporate tax 
rationales to the exclusion of other entity tax systems? The first answer is 
practical: the vast majority of organizations we exempt from tax are formed 
as corporations.20 Thus, while there may be some benefit to a consideration 
of trust-based or cooperative-based tax rationales, without exemption, most 
organizations that would have qualified as exempt would be responsible for 
the corporate income tax.21 Furthermore, in structure, nonprofit 
organizations look much like our large publicly traded corporations where 
there is a separation between firm ownership and management.22 There are 
no   “owners”   of   a   nonprofit   organization;;   consequently   we   cannot   use   a  
pass-through taxation system like we do for partnerships where it is clear 
who owns the firm. Therefore, in a nonprofit context, a first order 
 
 15 I.R.C. § 527(j). 
 16 Trusts are taxed under subchapter J of Title A of the Code. 
 17 Cooperatives are generally taxed under subchapter T of Title A of the Code. 
 18 Partnerships are taxed under subchapter K of Title A of the Code. 
 19 Insurance companies and banks are taxed under subchapters L and H of Title A of 
the Code, respectively. 
 20 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 52. Also, on an anecdotal level, a review 
of the Form 990 of each organization listed in the Top Ten Nonprofit Charitable 
Organizations, by Size of Total Assets, Tax Year 2008, a collection of organizations holding 
over $186 billion dollars, shows that each of these organizations formed as a corporation. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: CHARITIES & OTHER TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11esgiftsnap.pdf (last visited 
July 3, 2013). 
 21 Of course, even if subject to tax this does not mean that all of these organizations 
would owe tax. A nonprofit that receives donations to carry out its activities would generally 
be able to use section 102 to exclude this income from tax. 
 22 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 239 (1996) (discussing the 
great similarity in particular between some large nonprofit organizations such as hospitals 
and publicly traded companies); see also RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 
16 (1951). 
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consideration must be to employ an entity tax like the corporate income tax. 
Finally a focus on corporate tax rationales brings substantial complexity; 
adding other rationales to the mix might lead to a lack of clarity. Thus, I 
leave an examination of these other systems for another article. Because 
mutual benefits so closely resemble cooperative organizations, a review of 
cooperative taxation in connection with tax exemption might be particularly 
fruitful. 
This article is not about the charitable contribution deduction under 
section 170 of the Code. This provision is related to one of the benefits of 
some of the tax exempt organizations described in section 501(c) of the 
Code, such as the charitable organizations described in section 501(c)(3). 
The charitable contribution deduction has its own rationales that are distinct 
from the consideration of whether to allow certain entities to operate 
without paying tax upon their income.23 
Part II briefly describes the tax exempt sector and the theories 
regarding that sector. Part III provides a brief history of corporations and 
their taxation in the United States. Part IV reviews the rationales for 
imposing an income tax on corporations. Part V considers what corporate 
tax rationales suggest about tax exemption for nonprofit organizations. The 
article concludes with Part VI. 
II.  ORGANIZATIONS EXEMPT FROM FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
A.  Brief Description of the Tax Exempt Sector 
Under section 501(a) of the Code, organizations described in sections 
501(c), (d) (generally, nonprofit organizations), and 401(a) (pension plans) 
of the Code are exempt from federal income tax   (“tax   exempt 
organization”). This article focuses on tax exempt organizations described 
in section 501(c). Tax exempt organizations under section 501(a) comprise 
a diverse group: charitable organizations,24 social welfare organizations,25 
social clubs,26 business leagues, and others all qualify within the section.27 
 
 23 See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 309 (1972); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601 (2011); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable 
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of 
Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989); David E. Pozen, 
Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531 (2006). 
 24 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 25 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). 
 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(7). 
 27 I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). 
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Tax exempt organizations aid the poor, operate hospitals, advocate for the 
interests of members of business and labor, educate children and adults, 
operate pools and athletic facilities, and manage museums. In 2009, tax 
exempt organizations held over $4.3 trillion in assets.28 Tax exempt 
organizations are typically formed as a corporation,29 although some are 
formed as a trust, cooperative or unincorporated association. They are 
unified   by   the   “non-distribution   constraint.”30 This means tax exempt 
organizations may not distribute profits to owners.31 There is no constraint 
on earning a profit, only one on distributing profits to owners. 
Tax exemption provides exemption from income tax for income earned 
by an organization while engaged in activities promoting the purpose of the 
tax exemption.32 It does not generally exempt income from activities that 
are   not   related   to   an   organization’s   exempt   purpose. A tax exempt 
organization may lose tax exemption status if it operates for a substantial or 
primary non-exempt purpose.33 For example, if a charitable organization 
organized to relieve poverty adopted as a substantial purpose the operation 
of a restaurant, it should lose tax exemption if the restaurant has little 
connection to the exempt purpose of relieving poverty.34 Additionally, an 
exempt organization is required to pay the unrelated business income tax 
(UBIT) under sections 511–514 of the Code if it earns a profit from an 
activity unrelated to its exempt purpose. The unrelated business income tax 
generally does not apply to investment income or other sources of primarily 
passive income.35 
Tax exemption, if it is a subsidy, provides a financial benefit equal to 
the  applicable  tax  rate  multiplied  by  an  organization’s  annual  income.36 Of 
 
 28 KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: 
PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 2 (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/412434-NonprofitAlmanacBrief2011.pdf. This amount may not include the 
assets of organizations that do not file a return, such as churches. 
 29 See supra note 2. 
 30 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 
(1980). 
 31 Id. 
 32 I.R.C. § 501(c). 
 33 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008)  (“An  organization  will  
not be  . . . regarded [as operating exclusively for one or more exempt purposes] if more than 
an   insubstantial   part   of   its   activities   is   not   in   furtherance   of   an   exempt   purpose.”).  
Nonetheless, the actual point at which an organization should lose its exempt status, and not 
just pay the unrelated business income tax, for failure to operate for an exempt purpose is 
subject to much debate. See id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See I.R.C. § 512(b). 
 36 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also 
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course, if it is the case that tax exemption is such a subsidy, and this article 
questions that assumption, it is only a subsidy to the extent that the 
organization earns a profit during a taxable period. If a tax exempt 
organization earns no income, it gains no financial benefit from tax 
exemption. Thus, under a subsidy theory, a manager helps an organization 
to benefit from tax exemption only if she saves the earnings of the firm for 
a future year. Naturally, those organizations with greater financial resources 
and thus opportunities to earn income in the year will reap a greater benefit 
from the subsidy. An organization that earns $100,000 in income at a 
constant 36 percent tax rate receives a subsidy of $36,000, while an 
organization that earns $1,000,000 earns a $360,000 subsidy. Such a 
subsidy is not connected to the positive values promoted by the 
organization, but only to how much income the organization earns. Because 
this article concludes that tax exemption for mutual benefit organizations is 
a subsidy, this quality of tax exemption, giving greater benefit to those with 
greater resources, seems an odd policy choice. 
Scholars have attempted to categorize the tax exempt sector because of 
the assortment of tax exempt organizations it encompasses. The most basic 
distinction   made   is   between   “public   benefit”   and   “mutual   benefit”  
organizations.37 Public benefit organizations, as the name suggests, are 
operated for the benefit of the public. Charitable organizations, for instance, 
are considered public benefit organizations. A mutual benefit organization, 
on the other hand, is operated for the benefit of its members.38 For example, 
a beer league is operated for its members who are likely from a segment of 
the beer industry. Boris Bittker and George Rahdert categorize charitable 
organizations, social welfare organizations, and political parties as public 
benefit organizations and categorize social clubs, cooperatives, labor 
unions, and trade associations as mutual benefit organizations.39 Others 
have recognized a similar dichotomy but labeled these main distinctions as 
charitable and noncharitable.40 
Henry Hansmann categorized nonprofit organizations based on revenue 
 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,  461  U.S.  540,  544  (1997)  (“Both  tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax 
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the 
amount  of  tax  it  would  have  to  pay  on  its  income.”). 
 37 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 268 (Walter W. Powell & Richard 
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
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source and control.41 Donative nonprofits receive the bulk of their revenue 
via donations or grants. Commercial nonprofits, on the other hand, receive 
the bulk of their revenue via sale of services or goods.42 Organizations 
controlled by patrons obtaining services from the organization are deemed 
mutual organizations. Organizations not controlled by patrons are 
considered entrepreneurial organizations.43 These categories can be viewed 
as a matrix. There might be a donative entrepreneurial, a donative mutual, a 
commercial entrepreneurial or a commercial mutual. 
Most scholars view tax exempt organizations as a sector of our 
economy distinct from the for-profit and the government sectors.44 The for-
profit sector provides control rights, profit rights, and ownership transfer 
rights,45 whereas a democratic government sector provides the electorate 
with ownership rights and control to elect representatives.46 In reality, these 
distinctions are not so easy to make. After discussing tax exemption 
rationales below, the following part addresses how for-profit corporations 
grew directly from corporate bodies that initially started as government and 
nonprofit corporate bodies. 
B.  Tax Exemption Rationales 
What follows is a very brief consideration of exemption rationales. It is 
brief as this is territory well covered in many articles and books.47 
1. Subsidy Theories 
The prevailing theory continues to be that we provide tax exemption to 
nonprofit organizations providing some benefit to the state that is at least 
equal in value to the tax subsidy from the government.48 The theory 
presumes that the state would normally tax all entities within its borders. 
Thus, the state exercises legislative grace in exempting certain corporations 
from tax. The Court  uses  the  subsidy  theory.  It  has  stated,  “Congress  sought  
to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the 
 
 41 Hansmann, supra note 30, at 841. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. Hansmann   defines   patrons   as   “all   persons   who   transact   with   a   firm   either   as  
purchasers   of   the   firm’s   products   or   as   sellers   to   the   firm   of   supplies,   labor,   or   factors of 
production.”  HANSMANN, supra note 22, at 12. 
 44 Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, 
supra note 40, at 2. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 48 Stone, supra note 3, at 45. 
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development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or 
supplement  or  take  the  place  of  public  institutions  of  the  same  kind.”49 
There are a number of theorists who have used the subsidy theory. For 
example, Burton Weisbrod argues that we subsidize the tax exempt sector 
to solve government failure.50 Governments only provide public goods 
desired by the median voter. Nonprofits can provide those public goods for 
the voters outside the median and tax exemption serves as a subsidy to help 
this good activity take place.51 Hansmann argues that the exemption 
provides a subsidy to solve market-failure.52 Nonprofits tend to provide 
services and goods in situations that make patrons hesitant to purchase 
those service or goods because they believe managers are likely to shirk 
their responsibility and will possibly abscond with money. For instance, a 
donor is unable to determine whether the manager delivered charity to a 
third party. The nondistribution constraint assures such donors that the 
managers will not abscond with the money because they cannot make a 
profit. We provide tax exemption as a crude subsidy to encourage the right 
level of these efficient market providers. 
Other subsidy exemption rationale scholarship focuses solely on 
charitable organizations.53 Mark Hall and John Colombo focus on a 
donation market to determine whether we should provide tax exemption to 
charities. They argue, “the  primary  rationale  for  the  charitable  exemption  is  
to subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a substantial level of 
donative   support   from   the   public.”54 Rob Atkinson suggests we should 
provide tax exemption to public charities because they generate collective 
goods and services that benefit the public and are deemed inherently 
good.55 Atkinson argues that altruism is an inherently valuable meta-benefit 
produced by nonprofits and therefore it deserves tax subsidization.56 
Daniel Halperin questions whether tax exemption is a subsidy by 
 
 49 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Washington,   461   U.S.   540,   544   (1997)   (“Both   tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax 
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the 
amount  of  tax  it  would  have  to  pay  on  its  income.”). 
 50 Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-
Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE 
AND POLICY 21, 22–24 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
 51 BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 66–67 (1977). 
 52 Hansmann, supra note 3, at 67. 
 53 Altruism, supra note 3, at 510; Theories of Exemption, supra note 3, at 396; 
Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 3, at 316; Donative Theory, supra note 3, at 1384. 
 54 Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 3, at 390. 
 55 Theories of Exemption, supra note 3, at 402–04. 
 56 Altruism, supra note 3, at 628–38. 
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considering the normal income tax base.57 He concludes there is no subsidy 
to charitable organizations associated with the exemption for contributions 
and money earned from exempt related activities where those monies are 
clearly used for direct spending on charitable purposes.58 Exemption for 
capital investment and investment income, however, are subsidies because 
exempting that income diverges from normal measurement of income 
principals.59 Halperin examines mutual benefits as well and contends that 
investment income and nonmember income is effectively a subsidy for 
these organizations and should not be exempt.60 He argues, however, that 
tax exemption for member income for organizations such as social clubs is 
legitimate as it would not result in any substantial income.61 
2. Income Measurement Theory 
Bittker and Rahdert believe that   public   service   organizations   “should  
be wholly exempted from income taxation, because they do not realize 
‘income’   in   the  ordinary  sense  of   that   term  and  because,  even   if   they  did,  
there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the 
beneficiaries   to   pay.”62 They conclude that these organizations cannot 
easily measure their income.63 Based on the challenge in determining 
income and the impact the tax would have on the less fortunate, they found 
the exemption from income tax for charitable organizations to be justified 
for all purposes.64 They  argue  that  “mutual  benefit”  organizations  should  be  
viewed as a conduit and that we should tax any income that could be 
imputed to the members to the extent the entity earned investment income 
and income from nonmembers.65 In other words, to the extent such an 
organization earned investment income or earned money providing a 
service or good to a nonmember, the members should be individually taxed 
on their distributive share of income of the organization much like a 
partnership. Bittker and Rahdert accept exemption to the extent a mutual 
benefit earns income while its members are doing things they could do on 
 
 57 Exemptions a Subsidy, supra note 3; Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, supra note 3. 
 58 Exemptions a Subsidy, supra note 3, at 285. 
 59 Id. at 28586. 
 60 Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits supra note 3, at 135. 
 61 Id. at 135–36. 
 62 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305. Note that William Andrews seems to 
similarly find this as a justification in part for the exemption. Andrews, supra note 23, at 360 
(noting  the  “impracticality  of  measuring  individual  benefits . . . .”). 
 63 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 307. 
 64 Id. at 358. 
 65 Id. 
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their own without being taxed.66 They argue it is impractical to collect what 
they expect would be a minute amount of income.67 
3. Concluding Thoughts on Rationales 
Tax exemption scholarship tends to focus on the exemption for 
charitable organizations. The charitable sector is by far the largest of the 
nonprofit sector. Additionally, there is significant diversity in the whole of 
the tax exempt sector such that we may need a unique explanation for tax 
exemption for each organization. Nonetheless, finding common traits could 
help foster better rules for all of these organizations in the future. Along 
these lines, tax exemption scholars seem to assume tax exemption is a 
subsidy without critically examining this claim. None of the exemption 
theories consider what rationale we would use to justify taxing nonprofit 
organizations. Hansmann notes the oddity of taxing entities rather than 
individuals, but states that since the corporate tax is so entrenched it makes 
sense for purposes of his article to take the tax for granted.68 Thus, we are 
left with a set of theories that are arguably not properly grounded. This 
article contends that a rationale for why we might tax nonprofit 
organizations is necessary to a more complete theory for a rationale of tax 
exemption. 
In the following part I provide a history of corporations and their 
taxation in the United States. I believe this story helps in understanding the 
rationale for taxing corporations. 
III.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR TAXATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A.  History of Corporations 
A corporation is a legal fiction that started as bodies of people serving 
important public functions rather than serving the private for-profit function 
that we typically envision of corporations in the United States today. 
Nonprofit and for-profit corporations originate out of the same legal entity 
form. This fact suggests that certain corporations may exist in a twilight 
space between public and private where there may be an ambiguity in 
whether an entity should be taxed by the sovereign. 
 
 66 Id. at 305. 
 67 Id. at 354–57. Such an issue is not a problem with respect to social clubs because 
they are not able to exclude investment income and income from nonmembers from the 
unrelated business income tax. 
 68 Hansmann, supra note 3, at 56. 
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A corporation provides a fictional place in which multiple people can 
own property in common and act together in some endeavor.69 William 
Blackstone places the creation of companies with the Romans,70 where 
publicani formed companies called Societates, in some instances to collect 
taxes to pay for Roman conquest.71 According to Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny, the first corporate bodies in Rome were villages, towns, and 
colonies, and then gradually extended outward.72 
In England, the country from which America adopted its corporate 
legal   regime,   the   first   corporate   bodies   formed   as   “peace-guilds, the 
members of which were pledged to stand by each other for mutual 
protection.”73 From these peace guilds sprung municipalities and trade 
guilds.74 These  trade  guilds  were  more  like  today’s  trade  unions,  protecting  
member interests, rather than seeking out economic innovation.75 The 
substantial commercial corporations, still deeply connected to the crown, 
began to form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the 
exploration of the new world.76 Companies such as the African Company, 
the Russian Company, and the Company of Merchants of London formed in 
the nature of these peace guilds to issue shares and pool money necessary 
for complex and long-term financial endeavors for profit to the crown and 
private interest.77 These types of corporations played a significant role in 
the colonization of America.78 The Virginia Company, for instance, 
introduced representative democracy into the colonies, while the 
Massachusetts Company changed its stockholders (referred to as 
“freemen”) into state citizens.79 
Early in the history of the United States, the citizenry did not 
 
 69 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 1–15 (2003). 
 70 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 456 (1765, 
reprinted 1992); see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American 
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1945). 
 71 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 4. 
 72 Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 105, 106 (1888), (citing 2 SYSTEM DE HEUTIGEN REUMISCHEN RECHTS § 86, 
et. seq.). 
 73 Id. at 108 (citing LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS, 
AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS (1870)). 
 74 Williston, supra note 72, at 108. 
 75 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 13. 
 76 Williston, supra note 72, at 109. 
 77 Id. 
 78 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, 16 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 3 (1917). 
 79 MICKLETHWAIT &WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 69, at 34. 
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distinguish between private and public corporations.80 Legal authorities 
considered corporations either clerical or lay, and lay corporations were 
considered either eleemosynary or civil.81 During the 18th century, 
boroughs, universities, the Bank of England, and the East India Company, 
along with insurance and manufacturing companies, were all categorized as 
“civil.”82 Early Americans initially conceived of corporations as “agenc[ies]  
of government, endowed with public attributes, exclusive privileges and 
political power, and designed  to  serve  a  social  function  for  the  state.”83 
The earliest general incorporation statutes in the United States were for 
religious congregations, educational institutions such as Harvard and 
Dartmouth, libraries, charitable and beneficial societies, municipalities, and 
agricultural societies.84 The earliest for-profit corporations in the United 
States consisted primarily of public-minded infrastructure projects such as 
turnpikes, bridges, canals, banks, and insurance companies.85 Although 
modern for-profit corporations began development in the early part of the 
19th century, it was not until around 1865, with the rise of railroad 
corporations, that more significant corporations formed.86 
Throughout the evolution of the corporation, scholars adopted three 
distinct views regarding the personality of the corporation.87 Each of these 
views becomes important in the corporate tax rationale, and is therefore 
important to considering why we might (not) tax nonprofit organizations. 
Originally,   corporations   were   thought   of   as   “artificial   entities”   existing  
solely as constructs of the state.88 As Chief Justice John  Marshall  said,  “[a]  
corporation is an artificial being . . . . Being the mere creature of the law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon   it.”89 The second view considers corporations as an aggregate of 
 
 80 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 70, at 19. 
 81 Id. at 20. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 22. 
 84 See generally RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS 
CORPORATION, 1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 9–32 (1982). 
 85 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 10 (1932). 
 86 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
999, 1012 (2010). 
 87 For a discussion of these theories, see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical 
Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005). 
 88 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (discussing a 
corporation  as  an  “artificial  being”). 
 89 Id. 
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individuals having ownership of the entity acting on their behalf. This will 
be  referred  to  as  the  “aggregate  theory.”  Finally,  as  for-profit corporations 
grew well beyond the collective interest of their shareholders during the 
Progressive   Era,   with   managers   controlling   corporations,   a   “real   entity”  
view became the prevailing theory. 
B.  History of Corporate Taxation 
1. The Beginning in the States 
As corporations spread through the United States, individual states, 
which relied largely upon property taxes for revenue, had to transition from 
taxing tangible property to taxing intangible property.90 Because 
corporations made capital more movable, they made the taxation of 
property more challenging.91 As discussed by Steven Bank, these 
challenges sparked an evolution towards a general corporate tax beginning 
with property tax and special industry tax regimes.92 Initially, states 
attempted to treat corporations no differently than individuals in their 
property tax regimes.93 Yet this effort met with little success.94 States also 
tried special industry taxes for businesses such as banks, insurance 
companies, railroads, and transportation companies.95 These special 
industry taxes applied to any business entity conducting that special 
business, but typically these industries almost all conducted business as 
corporations.96 Special industry taxes ultimately began to morph into 
general taxes upon corporations, as happened in Pennsylvania.97 
2. Federal Taxation of Corporations 
The United States began to tax corporations at the federal level in 
earnest in 1864 as a component of the income tax enacted by the Union. 
The Civil War income tax taxed shareholders on the profits of the 
 
 90 BANK, supra note 8, at 1. 
 91 EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 136 (6th ed. 1909). 
 92 BANK, supra note 8, at 3-11. 
 93 Id. at 8. 
 94 R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, THE PRICE OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC SERVICES, TAXATION, 
AND THE AMERICAN CORPORATE STATE, 1877 TO 1929 13–14 (2003). 
 95 BANK, supra note 8, at 9. 
 96 Id. at 10. 
 97 SELIGMAN, supra note 91, at 166. The Pennsylvania corporate tax provided that 
“‘banks  and  all  corporations  whatever’  which  declared  a  dividend  of  one  per  cent  should  pay  
‘in  addition  to  all  present  taxes’  one-half mill for each dollar of the dividend or profit, and an 
additional one-half  mill  for  every  additional  one  per  cent  of  dividend.” Id. 
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corporations whether distributed or not,98 and imposed a separate entity tax 
on the earnings of special industries such as banks, insurance companies, 
and transportation companies.99 The public apparently viewed these special 
industry taxes as a withholding tax on corporations to enforce the individual 
income tax on dividends received.100 Although the system effectively 
operated as a conduit system whereby the corporation was essentially the 
collection mechanism for taxing shareholders on dividends, Bank contends 
that this tax presented the seeds of the modern corporate tax.101 Even then, 
the federal government determined that the tax did not apply to all 
corporations   subject   to   its   influence   by   exempting   “literary,   scientific,   or 
other charitable institutions” from the ambit of the tax.102  
After Congress let the income tax of the Civil War expire in 1872,103 it 
was not until 1909 that Congress again enacted a corporate entity tax by 
enacting an excise tax on the income of all corporations.104 The tax 
consisted of one percent of the net income of the corporation in excess of 
$5000.105 The Act additionally required corporations with income in excess 
of $5000 to file a return that became a public record.106 Much in the way 
the public viewed the Civil War tax on corporations as a conduit system 
intended to tax the earnings of a corporate shareholders, the public 
primarily viewed the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax as a tax on shareholders 
and a substitute for an income tax.107 In that regard, in addition to limiting 
its effect primarily to larger corporations, Congress again exempted certain 
corporations from this tax regime; exempted entities included organizations 
such   as   “labor,   agricultural   or   horticultural   organizations, . . . fraternal 
beneficiary societies, . . . domestic   building   and   loan   associations,”   and  
those  corporations  or  associations  “organized  and  operated  exclusively  for  
religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of 
 
 98 BANK, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 99 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223, 283–84 (1864); BANK, 
supra note 8, at 15. 
 100 FREDERIC C . HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM 1791-1895 96–97 (1896) (discussing the implementation of 
“stoppage  at  the  source”  principles);;  BANK, supra note 8, at 19. 
 101 BANK, supra note 8, at 14. 
 102 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 275 (1863). 
 103 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1954). 
 104 Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116. 
 107 BANK, supra note 8, at 56–57. 
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which  inures  to  the  benefit  of  any  private  stockholder  or  individual.”108 
Although the public primarily viewed the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax 
as a tax on shareholders,109 Marjorie Kornhauser has demonstrated that 
many proponents of the excise tax also viewed it as serving a regulatory 
function  to  reign  in  the  excess  of  the  “trust”  problem.110 Arising during the 
Progressive  Era,  the  “trust”  problem  involved  large  corporations  combining  
and defrauding investors by overcapitalization, along with monopolization 
and the destruction of individual enterprise.111 Part of the solution to this 
“trust”  problem  was  believed   to  be  publicity  of  corporate   information  and  
supervision.112 Kornhauser marshals evidence that the excise   taxes’  
proponents consistently highlighted regulatory functions of the tax.113 For 
instance, President William Howard Taft stated that if the tax was enacted, 
“we   [will]   have   made   a   long   step   toward   that   supervisory   control   of  
corporations which may prevent   a   further   abuse   of   power.”114 The 
reformers focused their efforts on large corporations: the final bill, for 
instance, exempted the first $5000 of income from corporation tax.115 
Although the most explicit regulatory aspect of the bill, its publicity 
function, was almost immediately eliminated after enactment,116 
Kornhauser still maintains that the tax was a first moderate step toward 
regulating corporate entities.117 With tax returns, the statute allowed the 
federal government to collect data on corporations, thus beginning the 
process of supervising corporate activity on a federal level.118 
On February 3, 1913, Delaware ratified the 16th Amendment, the 36th 
requisite state to do so, eliminating the potential constitutional infirmity of 
an individual income tax. Congress quickly enacted an income tax on 
October 3, 1913, as part of the Tariff Act of 1913, and with it a corporate 
 
 108 Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. 
 109 BANK, supra note 8, at 5657. 
 110 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 56 (1991); see also Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of 
Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 
11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 536–38 (2010) (coming to similar conclusions regarding 
the motivations of the proponents of the 1909 Corporate Excise tax). 
 111 Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 56. 
 112 Id. at 57. 
 113 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 106. 
 116 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. 11, 114-15; see also Kornhauser, supra 
note 110, at 132. 
 117 Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 134. 
 118 Id. at 134–35. 
HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5 9/9/2013  4:11 PM 
120 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  33:nnn 
income tax.119 Once more, Congress provided an exemption for those 
organizations originally exempted from the Corporate Excise Tax of 
1909.120 Additionally, Congress added new exempt organizations such as 
social welfare organizations, chambers of commerce, and business 
leagues.121 
The  1913  income  tax  adopted  a  “normal  tax”  of  one  percent, applied to 
both individuals and corporations.122 The statute allowed the deduction of 
dividends  from  the  “normal  tax,”  such  that  this  income  tax  again  applied  a  
pass-through regime to corporate income;123 however, there was a wrinkle. 
Congress imposed a surtax on incomes above $20,000 with a top rate of six 
percent.124 Because the corporate rate was only one percent, shareholders 
owing tax at the higher rates could leave earnings in the corporation where 
the income would only be taxed at the lower one percent rate, providing an 
opportunity for tax deferral. Congress attempted to lessen the deferral 
opportunity   by   imposing   a   tax   on   the   “unreasonable   accumulations   of  
earnings”  of  corporations.125 This strategy proved ineffective and became a 
constant irritant to progressive interests looking to see shareholder income 
properly taxed.126 
During the teens and twenties, Congress struggled with how to handle 
the tax deferral problem caused by the rate differential between the 
individual and corporate rates.127 This struggle led to the adoption of the 
pure corporate entity tax that we know today. In the 1930s, based on a 
public belief that undistributed corporate earnings were in part a cause of 
the Great Depression, Congress passed an undistributed profits tax on 
corporations at a twenty-seven percent rate, maintained the normal tax on 
corporations with a top rate of fifteen percent, but, critically, eliminated the 
individual dividend exemption from the normal tax.128 This was the fruition 
of the movement toward the classical system of corporate taxation with a 
tax on corporate income clearly separate and apart from individual 
shareholders. Although businesses were quickly able to convince Congress 
through lobbying efforts to remove the undistributed profits tax by 1939, 
 
 119 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 16672. 
 120 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 172. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166, 172. 
 123 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
 124 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166. 
 125 BANK, supra note 8, at 85. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 889, 926–27 (2006). 
 128 Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656. 
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the double tax regime was in place.129 
C.  Concluding Thoughts on History of Corporations and Its Impact on 
Nonprofits and Tax Exemption 
The corporation as an idea is a fictional entity that plays a role in both 
public and private spaces that has served to organize our cities, universities 
and churches, and operated to facilitate our most complex private business. 
Nonprofits present a tax challenge in this area as they occupy a twilight 
space between the very clearly public and very clearly private. While we 
seem to easily conclude that public entities such as states and 
municipalities, all generally organized as corporations, are exempt from 
federal income tax,130 and have a general sense that private for-profit 
corporations should bear a tax of some sort in our income tax system, when 
we start moving away from the clear public state-based activity we 
encounter difficulty in categorization. In the relationship between 
corporations and our society, we also see a struggle with the outsize impact 
these organizations have on our citizenry and the opportunity they provide 
to individuals for obtaining monetary advantages through their use. As 
discussed above, the United States has used the corporate tax to attempt to 
tax the wealth stored and utilized within corporations and to attempt to 
regulate the activities of corporations. The following part assesses the 
rationales for imposing the corporate income tax. The notion is that an 
examination of this rationale might help to better define the twilight space 
between what we conceive of as public space (nontaxable) and private 
space (potentially taxable). Additionally this examination might shed some 
light on why we may or may not think certain nonprofit entities are proper 
subjects of taxation. 
IV.   WHY IMPOSE AN INCOME TAX ON CORPORATIONS? 
Why impose a corporate income tax as a part of our income tax? I ask 
this question because I assume the rationale for imposing the corporate 
income tax should have some relationship to our rationale for exempting 
certain corporations from that tax. Additionally, if the rationales do not 
apply to tax exempt organization income, we need some other rationale for 
imposing a tax or we cannot speak  of  exemption  from  tax  as  a  “subsidy”  in  
 
 129 Bank, supra note 127, at 938. 
 130 For a discussion of the basis upon which state and local governments derive 
exemption, see Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The 
Need for Congressional Action, 26 GA. L. REV. 421, 430–32 (1992). 
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the way exemption is regularly conceived.131 If there is no rationale for 
taxing these organizations, calling exemption a subsidy makes no sense. For 
instance, although governmental entities are generally exempt from income 
tax, no one talks of this exemption as a subsidy. 
A.  What is the Corporate Tax and Who Bears Its Burden? 
What is the corporate income tax? The corporate income tax is 
imposed under section 11 of the Code and applies to a legal entity that (1) 
incorporates under the laws of a U.S. state, (2) allows its ownership 
interests to be publicly traded, or (3) elects to be treated as a corporation.132 
A corporation calculates its income similarly to the way the Code requires 
an individual to calculate his income for tax purposes.133 Such similarities 
include interest payments that are deductible134 and dividend payments that 
are generally not. In turn, dividends are generally taxable to the person who 
receives them. Because dividends are by definition the earnings and profits 
of a corporation, the taxation of income at the corporate level combined 
with the denial of a deduction for paid dividends leads people to label the 
corporate tax a double tax. The income is taxed at the corporate level and 
again at the shareholder level.135 These features of the current corporate 
income tax steer many to conclude that the corporate tax system is not ideal 
from an efficiency perspective.136 It leads to economic distortions because 
 
 131 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the theories and court opinions adopting the 
subsidy theory of tax exemption). 
 132 See I.R.C. § 7701 and the regulations thereunder. Nonprofit organizations organized 
as corporations meet the requirements of (1) and thus the general rule regarding a nonprofit 
corporation would be that it is taxed unless it meets one of the exemption requirements. 
 133 See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 4 (2009). 
 134 I.R.C. § 163(a). 
 135 If A forms a corporation by putting $100 into the corporation, he does so tax free to 
himself and to the corporation. Assume the corporation borrows $900 at 5% simple interest 
and must pay $45 to the lender in each year. After deducting salaries and interest payments 
and depreciating its assets, the corporation earns $100 of taxable income in year 1. Assuming 
a 35% tax rate, the corporation would pay $35 and have $65 to distribute to A. If the 
corporation distributed the $65 to A at the end of the year, A would pay 15% of $65 ($9.75) 
on the dividend received, leaving A with $55.25, for an effective tax rate of 44.75% on the 
income earned in that corporation. In comparison, on the $45 of interest paid to the lender 
during the year, the corporation deducts that amount, and the lender must pay ordinary rates 
of only 35%. Thus, the holder of corporate equity bears a higher tax burden (44.75%) as 
compared to the holder of corporate debt (35%) under this scenario. A also bears a higher 
burden than if he carried on the same actions as a sole proprietor or partnership. 
 136 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash Over the Control 
of Corporate Earnings, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 153 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 
2005). 
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of the incentives to choose debt over equity in the corporate form and to 
choose  other  entity  forms  over  corporations  because  of  the  “double  tax.”137 
That we think of this corporate tax structure as a double tax intuitively 
demonstrates the concept of the incidence of a tax. Because a corporation is 
fictional we do not think of it as bearing a tax; rather, some human bears its 
incidence. The corporate tax causes some human to have less wealth and 
consequently a lesser ability to enjoy life. Describing the corporate tax as a 
double tax thus illustrates that many intuitively believe that shareholders 
bear the burden of the corporate income tax, i.e., shareholders of 
corporations are believed to have a lesser ability to enjoy life as a result of 
having to pay the corporate tax. Nevertheless, economists find the corporate 
tax to be born by some combination of all holders of capital or perhaps 
some significant portion of worldwide labor.138 
B.  Presumption Regarding Purpose of the Income Tax and Its 
Connection to Corporations 
There are two main questions regarding why we impose an income tax 
on a corporate entity. The first focuses on why we impose a tax at the entity 
level rather than tax the shareholders. The second asks why we impose both 
an entity-level tax and an individual tax. This second question is often 
thought   to   be   a   question   of   fairness   because   of   the   “double   tax”   on  
corporate income mentioned above. This article is concerned mostly with 
the first question regarding why we might impose a tax on an entity because 
of its relationship to the tax exempt organization, where we evaluate an 
entity tax alone. Nevertheless, the second question regarding why there is a 
“double   tax”   on   corporate   income   often   informs   the   debate   regarding   the  
corporate tax rationale. In reviewing corporate tax rationales, it is important 
to keep this fact in mind because this feature of the corporate tax is not 
particularly apposite to a tax exempt organization where there would only 
be one level of tax. 
Without getting caught up in the debate over the proper tax base, I note 
that to consider the corporate tax rationales, we must also at least briefly 
consider the rationale for the individual income tax. Why do we choose 
income as a tax base? There are generally thought to be three primary 
 
 137 For a current consideration of all the efficiency problems associated with the 
corporate tax, see SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 25; see also Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX 
NOTES 1767, 1768 (Sept. 27, 1999). 
 138 For an excellent review of debate regarding the incidence of the corporate tax, see 
Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax?: A Review of What We Know (Nat’l  
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,686, 2005). 
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criteria in evaluating a tax: equity, efficiency, and administrability.139 Much 
has been written on each of these criteria but such a discussion is beyond 
the scope of this article. I focus on the equity rationale as perhaps the most 
important for the purpose of this article. The equity rationale refers to 
whether the tax system is fair to individuals. In The Wealth of Nations, 
Adam Smith set out the most common notion regarding equity as follows: 
“[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to . . . the revenue which 
they respectively enjoy . . . .”140 Today, this is commonly thought of as 
ability to pay.141 While there is much debate as to whether ability to pay, a 
benefit principle, or any other idea of distributive justice properly states a 
coherent metric for considering equity,142 surely we adopt an income tax 
base  as  a  measuring  device  to  assess  each  individual’s  level  of  welfare.143 
Efficiency refers to the impact a particular tax imposes on an economy. 
Administrability refers to the ease of administration of a tax. Although 
these latter two factors are discussed below, each is secondary to the 
question of equity for purposes of the income tax rationale. 
If our income tax system goal is to measure some quantity of benefit or 
ability to pay, imposing a tax on an entity such as a corporation is an 
indirect way of accomplishing that goal. It makes it challenging to 
determine who bears the burden of the tax, and it distorts the ability to pay 
calculus. Thus, the question is set for why we impose a corporate income 
tax. If we are genuinely interested in allocating the burden of government 
among citizens according to ability to pay, choosing to impose the income 
tax on corporate entities likely leads to some people overpaying and some 
people underpaying. Additionally, if we have imposed a tax on the income 
of a corporation, why are we additionally applying a tax on dividends 
received by shareholders? 
 
 139 See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 100 (1990); 
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 166 
(1997). 
 140 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777–78 (1776). 
 141 JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 
16th ed. 2012); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET PROPOSAL 
6 (Comm. Print 2004). 
 142 See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 12 (2002) (extensive discussion of whether ability to pay or a benefit principle 
presents a coherent theory of fairness); see also Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 867 (2002) (critiquing the ability to pay principle). 
 143 See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 20. 
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C.  Administrative  Convenience/That’s  Where  the  Money  Is 
One reason we might tax the entity itself is administrative convenience. 
Corporations provide a convenient place from which to collect tax — they 
have money and they have the administrative capacity to easily deliver the 
money to the government.144 This theory might garner support from a 
political calculus. It is easier for a political system to adopt needed taxes if 
there is a sense that no one is really being taxed. The government provides 
important public goods, but might have trouble getting the citizenry to pay 
enough money for the optimal level of those goods if they have to pay those 
taxes in a way in that makes them believe they are being overburdened. 
Because the corporate tax is not a particularly salient tax for the vast 
majority of the voting population,145 if a legislator is looking for a way to 
pay for the optimal level of public goods, the corporate tax could be a 
useful tool in collecting the money for these goods.146 Using salience terms 
coined by David Gamage and Darien Shanske, we could say that the 
corporate   tax   lacks   “political   salience”   for   the   vast   majority   of the 
population, that is, its imposition is unlikely to influence citizens to vote for 
or against a politician because they are unlikely to be particularly aware of 
the  corporate  tax.  We  could  also  say  that  it  lacks  “market  salience,”  because  
much of the population is likely not aware that they are paying the tax.147 
This is not much of a justification for the tax from an equity 
perspective if that equity perspective is based upon using income as the best 
metric of ability to pay. The principal justification for this perspective is 
that the State needs money and the corporate entity is an administratively 
easy place from which to collect that money. Of course, if we do not adopt 
the notion that fairness in taxation (and perhaps more broadly government 
operation) must exist at the point of tax collection, and focus instead on 
ultimate outcomes, we may not be bothered with the result of collecting 
revenue through such a corporate tax.148 
 
 144 Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations? (Technical Comm. on Bus. Taxation, 
Working Paper No. 96-2, 1996); SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 11; see also GOODE, supra 
note 22, at 26. 
 145 For a discussion of the burgeoning literature on the idea of salience and tax policy, 
see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and 
Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011). 
 146 See J. GREGORY BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION 
INCOME TAX 7 (1980). 
 147 Gamage & Shanske, supra note 145, at 24–25. 
 148 See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 8 (arguing  “taxes  must  be  evaluated  
as  part  of  the  overall  system  of  property  rights  that  they  help  to  create.”). 
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D.  Aggregate Theory/Tax on the Shareholders 
When the United States adopted a corporate income tax first during the 
Civil War, then in 1909 and again in 1913, proponents supported it largely 
because they believed it operated as a tax on wealthy shareholders.149 As 
discussed above in reference to the history of taxation, the early versions of 
the corporate tax effectively adopted a conduit system where the 
corporation paid a tax, but it was thought of as a withholding system to 
ensure payment from shareholders on dividends received. Although there is 
now both an entity tax and a shareholder level tax, a primary justification 
for the corporate tax remains that it is a tax on shareholder income.150 The 
theory arises from an aggregate view of the corporation: the corporation is 
the property of its shareholders who are taxed based on their share of 
corporate income through the corporate income tax. 
What do we mean by the term shareholder? A shareholder owns a share 
of stock in a corporation.151 As defined in a basic text on corporations, a 
share  of  stock  is  “primarily  a  profit-sharing contract, a unit of interest in the 
corporation  based  on  a  contribution  to  the  corporate  capital.”152 That profit-
sharing contract entitles the shareholder to three rights: (1) control, (2) 
proprietary rights, and (3) certain ancillary and remedial rights.153 Under 
the shareholder theory, we believe this profit sharing contract makes the 
annual income of a corporation subject to the income tax. Shareholders with 
these profit sharing contracts presumably have a greater ability to pay, and 
therefore it is fair to include the   corporation’s   income   as   part   of   the   tax  
base. 
A few problems arise with this theory. Corporate tax incidence 
analyses suggest that the burden of the corporate tax is born by individuals 
other than the actual corporate shareholders.154 Additionally, taxing 
shareholders  on  corporate   income  before  they  have  “realized”  that   income  
 
 149 See supra Part III.B. 
 150 SHAVIRO, supra note 133, at 23; Bird, supra note 144, at 9. 
 151 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 454 (1996); see Reid Thompson & 
David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership 1 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., Institute For Law 
and Economics, Working Paper No. 621, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177022 (discussing what it currently means to own a share of 
stock and noting that title to most shares of stock today are held by Cede & Co. rather than 
the individual who we think of as the owner). 
 152 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 13.01, at 
718 (2d ed. 2003). 
 153 Id. § 13.01, at 718–19. 
 154 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1204. 
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could be thought to violate the realization principle of our income tax.155 
Finally, the tax rate applied to corporations bears no resemblance to the 
rates we apply to individuals based on their income levels.156 Nonetheless, 
there are practical reasons consistent with this aggregate shareholder view 
that support tax at the corporate level. First, without the corporate tax, 
shareholders could use a corporation as a tax deferral device. In other 
words, if no tax applied to corporate income, individuals who controlled a 
corporation could defer tax by leaving income within the corporation at a 
zero percent tax rate annually. Such annual tax savings for owners of 
corporate equity, as compared to owners of other business entities such as 
partnerships whose income is taxed annually whether distributed or not, 
would add up to significant amounts. Secondly, the administrative 
convenience identified above may play at least a part in justifying a tax on 
shareholders at the corporate level; given the massive number of 
shareholders in modern public corporations, finding a means of determining 
the distributive share of income and loss of each shareholder could be a 
terrible logistical nightmare. Imposing a current income tax on the 
corporation is a potential imperfect solution to that problem. Thus, the 
shareholder theory, while not perfect, does at least provide some 
satisfactory equitable and practical grounds for the corporate tax. 
E.  Real Entity/Regulatory Function 
Some argue that the corporate tax regulates managers acting on behalf 
of publicly traded entities.157 Publicly traded entities are defined by the 
separation of ownership and control.158 As a result of this separation in 
publicly traded corporations,   “important   decision   agents   do   not   bear   a  
substantial   share   of   the  wealth   effects   of   their   decisions.”159 Under these 
circumstances managers may not act as the best agents of the 
shareholders;160 also, managers of very large sources of wealth may act in 
 
 155 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920). 
 156 Compare I.R.C. § 1, with I.R.C § 11. 
 157 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for Dividend Deduction, 
65 TAX LAW. 3, 7 (2011); Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 61; see also Hideki Kanda & Saul 
Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991) 
(arguing that employing a separate corporate tax aligns the manager of the corporation as an 
agent working in the tax interests of the shareholders). 
 158 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 4; Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 159 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983). 
 160 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 85, at 3. 
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ways inconsistent with the good of the larger public.161 The corporate tax 
arguably can act to rectify these problems. As discussed above, the enactors 
of the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax thought the corporate tax would regulate 
corporate managers.162 This view of the corporate tax takes a real entity 
view, that is, we tax the corporation because we are trying to have an 
impact on the behavior of the corporation. 
Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that the separation of ownership and control 
in publicly traded companies leads to significant power concentration in the 
hands of a few: the corporate tax, he argues, serves as a check on that 
corporate managerial power.163 Additionally, it affords the government a 
tool to ensure the corporation acts broadly in the interests of shareholders 
and the public.164 Avi-Yonah   states:   “the   corporate   tax   is   justified   as   a  
means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of 
corporate management, which is inconsistent with a properly functioning 
liberal democratic polity.”165 Avi-Yonah argues the corporate tax (1) limits 
the amount of money a corporation manager has at her disposal to influence 
the   political   process   (the   “limiting   function”),   and   (2)   provides   a   tool   to  
incentivize  or  discourage  a  corporate  manager’s  use  of corporate resources 
(the  “incentive  function”).166 
The limiting function is justified, Avi-Yonah contends, because 
unreasonable accumulations of wealth are not healthy for a democracy.167 
As Kay Lehman Scholzman, Sidney Verba and Henry Brady state, 
“[a]mong  the requirements for a functioning democracy are mechanisms for 
the free expression of political voice so that members of the public can 
communicate information about their experiences, needs, and preferences 
and hold public officials accountable for their conduct   in   office.”168 If 
certain individuals amass vast amounts of wealth, this might so significantly 
tilt the balance of political voice such that the democracy would be one in 
name only.169 Given (1) the separation of ownership and control, (2) the 
 
 161 Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1243. 
 162 Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 53. 
 163 Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1225. 
 164 See GOODE, supra note 22, at 40; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244. 
 165 Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244–45. 
 166 Avi-Yonah refers to this latter function  as   the  “regulatory   function.”   Id. at 1246. I 
have used a different term, the incentive function, to clarify it from the term it modifies. 
 167 Id. at 1244; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, 
and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1412–13 (2002). 
 168 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL 
VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2012). 
 169 Admittedly, the Court may not countenance this idea. Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election   Comm’n,   558   U.S.   310,   349–50   (2010)   (“[T]he   concept   that   government   may  
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fact that corporations need not distribute earnings to its owners, and (3) that 
there is power in control of large sources of money, Avi-Yonah argues that 
it is essential to our democracy to assess a tax on corporations to limit the 
power of these entities to ensure a more well-functioning democracy.170 
The incentive function uses the tax system to incentivize the managers 
of the entity to use its resources in a socially valuable manner, and to 
discourage the managers from using the resources in a socially harmful 
manner.171 For instance, Congress prohibits deductions for bribes paid to 
foreign officials,172 and empirical research suggests this has had an impact 
on the behavior of corporate managers.173 Avi-Yonah cites investment 
incentives and incentives toward research and development as examples of 
the types of devices Congress has used to incentivize managers to exercise 
their resources in ways that are helpful to society.174 
The regulatory justification of the corporate tax springs from a need to 
justify taxing corporate income twice. Avi-Yonah believes that the only 
appropriate place for this double level of taxation is with respect to publicly 
traded corporations.175 He believes that taxing owners is sufficient for all 
other businesses.176 The key to this argument for Avi-Yonah is the 
separation of ownership and management. 
Some question the regulatory function theory. Bank, for instance, 
contends that even if the tax served a regulatory function, the tax fails in 
fulfilling this function.177 Secondly, Bank claims that corporate managers 
are likely able to shift the incidence of the tax such that the tax does not 
impact   a  manager’s   behavior.178 It would be helpful if we had additional 
empirical work to determine whether corporate taxation has a real 
regulatory impact. Recent scholarship considers the relationship between 
tax sheltering activity and corporate governance.179 As described by Mihir 
Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala,   the   “basic   intuition   for   how  corporate  
 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others   is   wholly   foreign   to   the   First   Amendment”) (quoting United States v. Automobile 
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 597 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 170 Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1244. 
 171 Id. at 1248–49. 
 172 I.R.C. § 162(c); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1248. 
 173 Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1248–49. 
 174 Id. at 1249. 
 175 Avi-Yonah & Chenchinski, supra note 157, at 7–8. 
 176 Id. at 8. 
 177 BANK, supra note 8, at xvii. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See generally MPA STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., COMPETITION & TAX LAW, 
TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Wolfgang Schön et al. eds., 2008). 
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governance and taxation interact is that tax avoidance demands complexity 
and obfuscation to prevent detection. These characteristics, in turn, can 
become  a  shield  for  managerial  opportunism.”180 In other words, efforts to 
stamp out corporate tax avoidance may be complementary to establishing 
good corporate governance such that the corporation is managed in the 
interests of the shareholders rather than on behalf of the managers 
themselves. There are some initial positive results to suggest a corporate tax 
may positively impact corporate managerial behavior in such a way.181 
Continued research in this area should be profitable. 
Michael Doran argues that the regulatory justification seems to justify 
taxing any large collection of wealth.182 In this regard, he argues that the 
United   States   has  managed   to   “exert substantial public control over [the] 
private concentrations of wealth . . . .”   of   pension   plans   and   charitable  
organizations without a tax.183 While there are limited taxes imposed on 
pensions and other tax exempt organizations, as Doran notes, it is not clear 
that   the   government   has   “exercised   substantial   public   control”   over   all  
private  concentrations  of  wealth.  This  article  does  not  quibble  with  Doran’s  
claim, but instead examines whether the regulatory theory should be 
expanded to cover these other large concentrations of wealth, and if not, 
whether the public control over these concentrations of wealth is an 
effective substitute for the corporate tax. 
Another critique contends that such a regulatory function at the federal 
level violates principles of federalism. Corporate law is within the domain 
of the states. When Congress debated the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax, many 
argued vociferously against the publicity portion of the tax because it 
encroached on state regulatory territory.184 In a modern context, James 
Fishman recently argued, in part on federalism grounds, that the Service 
lacks authority to regulate nonprofit corporate governance.185 Such 
regulatory activity, in his opinion, should be left to the states. Of course, a 
willingness to allow the federal government broad authority over corporate 
governance through the Securities Exchange Commission would seem to 
suggest that this federalism concern is not widely shared among the public, 
at least with respect to publicly traded corporations. 
 
 180 Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax and Corporate Governance: An 
Economic Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 179, at 13, 14. 
 181 Id. at 19–20. 
 182 Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 517, 530 n.47 (2009). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 97. 
 185 James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s  Nonprofit  Corporate  Governance  
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548–49 (2010). 
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The regulatory theory could benefit from more empirical work 
demonstrating its effectiveness. Given current rising levels of income186 
and political voice187 inequalities, it seems to be in our interest to continue 
exploring this function of the corporate tax. A tax that could both raise 
revenue and direct the use of wealth toward more beneficial purposes, both 
for the country and for shareholders, seems ideal. If it is in fact a tax that is 
less salient on a market and political basis, it also seems ideal as a means 
towards meeting our current long-term fiscal imbalance. On a final analysis 
the regulatory theory of the corporate tax seems to offer some potential as a 
real rationale for the corporate tax. While more work is needed in 
considering its impact, it should not be thrown out simply because of 
inconsistencies in its application or based on a simple determination that it 
has not achieved its goal: we must also keep this regulatory function of the 
corporate tax in mind when considering organizations we might determine 
should be exempted from the corporate tax. 
F.  Artificial Entity/Benefits Theory 
One theory claims the corporate tax is a charge for the benefits of the 
rights to incorporation. The right to form a corporation is a valuable right 
giving those who use it the ability to aggregate wealth for business purposes 
and obtain limited liability. Under this benefits theory, individuals who use 
such rights should pay a tax for those benefits. For example, when the Court 
initially upheld the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, it referred to the tax as 
“an   excise   upon   the   particular   privilege   of   doing   business   in   a   corporate  
capacity . . . .”188 Because many organizational forms — such as a limited 
liability company, a limited partnership, or even S corporation tax status — 
provide benefits like those of a corporation without application of an entity 
tax, the benefits claim lacks a coherent rationale. At the same time, Rebecca 
Rudnick argues the tax could be consideration in exchange for the 
opportunity to sell equity on a public market.189 Under this theory, the 
separate corporate income tax is justified only on corporations with access 
to a public equity market. This theory does provide a plausible basis for the 
corporate tax as currently structured. Still, it is only a rationale that the 
corporate tax possibly has grown to include. This article contends, however, 
that it has less explanatory power from an intuitive or evidentiary basis than 
 
 186 See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 3 (2011). 
 187 See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 168. 
 188 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911). 
 189 Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 985–86 (1989). 
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either the shareholder or regulatory rationales. 
G.  Bank’s Capital Lock-in Theory 
Bank argues that we have a corporate tax in addition to a shareholder 
tax because corporate managers preferred to maintain strong capital lock-in 
features of a corporation.190 Capital lock-in refers to a feature of a business 
entity that involves little pressure from owners to return equity.191 
Organizations featuring substantial capital lock-in exhibit a greater 
longevity than those without. Corporate law itself works to ensure that there 
is little pressure on a corporation to return equity upon the request of a 
shareholder. This distinguishes a corporation from a partnership, which 
generally has to return equity upon request of a partner. If the United States 
were to tax shareholders currently on their share of corporate income, 
shareholders would put pressure on corporations to distribute dividends 
sufficient to pay such taxes. Because corporate managers highly value 
capital lock-in, they resist any efforts to impose such a flow-through tax 
system.192 
While  Bank’s  capital   lock-in theory is persuasive in its argument that 
corporate managers work to maintain a separate entity tax in order to have a 
more   powerful   entity   in   their   control,   Bank’s   theory   assumes   the   natural  
order for an income tax would be to tax the shareholders on corporate 
income. Thus, Bank seems to accept the aggregate view that the corporate 
tax is imposed to tax shareholders; however, he simply contends that 
allowing corporate entities to maintain their capital in order to increase the 
size and scope of their business trumps a possibly more equitable 
arrangement. The reverse, i.e., applying a partnership-like flow-through 
regime on corporations, would reduce corporate managerial power because 
the managers would be forced to distribute money as dividends so that the 
shareholders could pay taxes on their share of earnings. 
Thus, for purposes of examining tax exemption, this benefits theory 
seems more of a gloss on the shareholder rationale rather than its own 
independent rationale. Nonetheless, these practical considerations of 
managerial power working to maintain entity wealth through tax policy 
could play a part in the story of why we have maintained tax exemption for 
certain nonprofit entities and should be kept in mind as we examine tax 
exemption rationales. 
 
 190 See Bank, supra note 127. 
 191 For a discussion of the idea and arguably positive role played by capital lock-in, see 
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003). 
 192 See Bank, supra note 127. 
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H.  Odds and Ends 
The theories discussed above ignore the fact that corporate tax applies 
whether or not an entity has shareholders who can receive distributions. 
Under the Code, a corporation includes a business entity organized under 
federal, state, and federally recognized Indian tribe statutes referring to the 
entity as a corporation or as incorporated.193 Yet the corporate tax is written 
broadly, such that it could apply, and under certain circumstances does 
apply, even when connected to a governmental entity.194 For instance, an 
organization carrying out an essential governmental function with an 
income that accrues to a state or political subdivision thereof is allowed to 
exclude its income from the corporate tax under section 115 of the Code, 
but must still file a corporate return (Form 1120) with the Service. Any 
nonprofit organized as a corporation also meets this definition of an 
organization subject to the corporate income tax. Thus, the suggestion that 
the corporate income tax is a backstop to ensure that shareholders are 
paying tax on earnings, or that it is serving a regulatory function for the 
managers of publicly traded companies, does not explain the corporate 
income tax as it applies to entities within our system. 
We are thus left with a series of imperfect explanations for the 
corporate income tax. The two most publicly accepted theories, both now 
and at the times of enactment, continue to be the shareholder theory and the 
regulatory theory. Given their imperfect explanatory nature, we cannot 
expect these theories to provide a perfect means of assessing nonprofit 
rationales. Nevertheless, they are the content we have for justifying the 
 
 193 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2012). 
 194 Although not strictly under consideration in this article, state, municipal entities and 
entities connected with such governmental groups are also generally organized as 
corporations. See Aprill, supra note 130, at 430–32 (discussing I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
14,407 (1935), where the Service concluded that although a corporation, a state 
governmental entity is not a corporation for purposes of the Code); see also Ellen P. Aprill, 
The Integral, the Essential, and the Instrumental: Federal Income Tax Treatment of 
Governmental Affiliates, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 803 (1998) (discussing the tax status of this 
vast and complex array of state and municipal governmental affiliates). Federal 
instrumentalities are expressly excluded from the income tax too, via section 501(c)(1), but 
there are plenty of challenging twilight organizations connected with the federal government 
that are potentially subject to corporate income tax — for instance, consider the National 
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust, which Congress exempted from tax under section 
501(c)(28). The subtext of such an inclusion in a list of exempt organizations is that it could 
be subject to the corporate income tax. The Railroad Retirement Trust is theoretically 
subjected to the unrelated business income tax under sections 511–514 of the Code because 
it is exempt from tax under section 501(a) because it is described in section 501(c). In other 
words, this federally connected entity is at least in part arguably subjected to the corporate 
income tax presumably because it is a corporation. 
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corporate tax as an entity income tax. If these rationales do not support the 
taxation of nonprofits as well, we either have to look for some other 
rationale to support their taxation such that we can call tax exemption a 
subsidy, or we can accept that tax exemption is not really a subsidy at all. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EXEMPTION 
A failure to consider corporate tax theories leaves our tax exemption 
rationales incomplete.195 Because most tax exempt organizations would 
face the corporate tax if not exempt,196 comparing rationales for applying a 
corporate tax at the entity level should provide feedback information 
regarding why we should exempt certain entities from that tax. Although 
this article contends that the two significant theories that likely have the 
most explanatory power with respect to the corporate tax are the 
shareholder and regulatory theories, this part will analyze each of the other 
theories. The focus however will be upon the former two theories. The 
focus on the shareholder theory serves to highlight and question the 
assumption of most rationales explaining that exemption serves as a 
subsidy. The article concludes that it is likely not a subsidy for truly 
charitable organizations. On the other hand, tax exemption is a subsidy for 
mutual benefit organizations because these organizations have individuals 
who are akin to shareholders, that is, individuals who control the 
organization and can direct its benefits in their direction. The focus on the 
regulatory theory highlights the fact that our exemption rationales ignore 
the potential regulatory function that the corporate tax serves. The point 
being that a choice to exempt is not just an exemption from an obligation to 
pay revenue, but also an exemption from a regulatory regime. 
A.  Administrative  Convenience/That’s  Where  the  Money  Is 
If we tax corporations because they have the money and organizational 
means to easily pay a tax, then the assumption that tax exemption is a 
subsidy that is commonly made is likely reasonable for almost all tax 
exempt organizations. Such   a   “corporate   income   tax”   should   apply   to   all  
corporate entities including nonprofit corporate entities. Tax exempt 
organizations hold substantial assets, earn significant revenue, and often 
have the organizational means to pay the tax just like publicly traded 
 
 195 See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 133,  at  3  (“Look at one [article of the corporate tax] 
without the others, and it is easy to draw myopic and inaccurate conclusions about the 
overall landscape.”). 
 196 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2. 
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corporations.197 The tax should therefore apply to all except possibly small 
nonprofit organizations under this theory. Thus, any determination to 
exempt nonprofit organizations from this corporate income tax can be said 
to be a subsidy because we would tax these organizations in the normal 
course of this notion of the income tax. By exempting nonprofit 
organizations we are relieving them from an obligation they would have in 
the normal course of business of our country. 
What might rules for tax exempt organizations look like under this 
administrative convenience corporate tax rationale? The rationale might 
suggest tax exemption only where revenue-neutral to the government. We 
might require an organization to demonstrate that it lessens the burdens of 
government.198 We might also impose a payout requirement as is imposed 
on private foundations.199 Yet because this corporate rationale has little 
justification other than ease of administration it could just as easily be used 
to support tax exemption as a broad subsidy that Congress decides to grant 
to particular organizations. Because this rationale has such little explanatory 
value from an equity perspective, however, it provides little in the way of 
guidance to tax exemption rationales. 
B.  Aggregate Theory/Tax is on Shareholders 
Given the history of the corporate tax, the popular conceptions 
regarding the tax, and the simple practical aspect of administering the 
income tax, a major purpose of the corporate tax appears to be to tax 
shareholders.200 Although this rationale suffers substantial imperfections, as 
discussed in the notes above in Part IV.G, there are simply too many 
practical realities of our income tax system that suggest our public common 
intention in imposing corporate tax is to tax shareholders. 
This aggregate theory of corporate taxation leaves taxing nonprofit 
 
 197 A significant amount of our economy is held and earned in nonprofit tax exempt 
solution. According to the Service business master file numbers from 2010, as recorded by 
the Urban Institute, organizations exempt under section 501(c), exclusive of those described 
in section 501(c)(3), held over $1 trillion in assets and earned over $384 billion in revenue, 
while those described in section 501(c)(3) held over $2.48 trillion in assets and earned over 
$1.3 trillion in revenue. See Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1. 
php?state=US (last visited July 5, 2013). 
 198 Robert Louthian & Amy Henchey, Lessening the Burdens of Government, in 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
(CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 (1992), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf. 
 199 See I.R.C. § 4942. 
 200 See discussion supra Part IV.G. 
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entities on somewhat shaky ground. The shareholder rationale requires 
shareholders — individuals who own shares in the corporation. By 
definition, nonprofit organizations should have no such individuals. If a 
nonprofit organization earns income in a year, to whom should we attribute 
the earning of that income? If we were concerned about the realization 
principle with respect to a for-profit corporation, we should be doubly 
concerned with that principle with respect to a nonprofit organization. 
There is no one to whom we can easily attribute the benefits and the 
burdens of a nonprofit organization. 
What does the shareholder rationale suggest about the rules for tax 
exemption? The shareholder theory could lead to the simple conclusion that 
we must exempt organizations that have no shareholders or individuals 
equivalent to shareholders. Of course, the Code generally prohibits tax 
exempt organizations from allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of 
private shareholders or individuals,201 and there are also rules prohibiting 
most of these organizations from benefitting only members.202 This simple 
version of the shareholder theory supports a claim that tax exemption for 
nonprofit organizations is not a subsidy as most theories on exemption 
presume, but is instead the natural order for nonprofit organizations. The 
income should only be taxed upon being realized by an individual. 
Nevertheless, this assessment oversimplifies the shareholder theory 
because it does not consider the broader practical justification for the 
shareholder theory. The practical basis of the shareholder theory provides 
that without a tax upon income within an entity on an annual basis, those 
who obtain its earnings in the future have obtained tax deferral. The impact 
of this practical corporate tax rationale on tax exemption depends on how 
much emphasis we put on the practical component and how much we put 
on the simple fact of ownership of shares leading to taxation. The 
ownership feature is a strong component of the shareholder justification, 
suggesting that we can tax corporate income currently because we are 
taxing  the  earnings  of  each  shareholder  and  we  can  tax  each  shareholder’s  
share of income because of the control and right to earnings they have with 
respect to the corporation. The practical justification is mostly implicated 
where there are individuals who exhibit a similar ability to control via 
voting on board members and who have a right to earnings. 
Adopting the shareholder rationale with a strong ownership component 
but a weak practical tax deferral justification suggests that our tax 
exemption system should provide tax exemption to those entities where the 
likelihood of individuals who might control the entity and direct its retained 
 
 201 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (4). 
 202 See, e.g., rules regarding operating as a business league under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). 
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earnings to themselves is low. I will refer to this as the   “shareholder  
rationale  requirements.”  These  shareholder  rationale  requirements  keep  the  
focus of the shareholder theory on the fact of ownership as leading to a 
right to tax the entity, but are wary of the potential for tax deferral. The 
potential for tax deferral is greatest where there is an individual who 
controls the entity and who has the right to direct its earnings accordingly. 
The rules applicable to charitable organizations that qualify as tax 
exempt, because described in section 501(c)(3),203 impose requirements that 
make it rather difficult to direct earnings toward an individual who controls 
the organization. In addition to requiring such an organization to operate 
exclusively for a charitable purpose, section 501(c)(3) directly prohibits the 
distribution   of   earnings   “to   the   benefit   of   any   private   shareholder   or  
individual”  of  a  charitable  organization.204 In other words, it prohibits a big 
part of what we consider to be ownership — the right to the earnings of an 
entity. The regulations further provide that a charitable organization must 
operate for the public interest, not private.205 Although by no means 
foolproof, these requirements and others significantly constrain the ability 
of individuals to use a charitable organization for their private purposes. 
These rules require significant monitoring by the Service to ensure the 
system is not abused; but the rules provide the Service bounds within which 
it can police charities to prohibit the use of these organizations for personal 
gain or even for general tax deferral purposes. 
Thus, if our rationale for taxing a corporate entity is a desire to tax 
shareholders, such a rationale does not pertain to a charitable organization. 
Operated in an ideal manner, a charitable organization presents no 
individuals approaching the status of a shareholder. Consequently, there is 
no subsidy at all for truly charitable organizations. Because in the normal 
course of taxation we would have no basis upon which to apply a tax to 
such an organization, the state is giving the charitable organization nothing 
by not taxing it. The state had no right, under a shareholder taxation theory 
to tax a charitable organization in the first place. 
The rules applicable to tax exempt mutual benefit organizations, 
 
 203 “Corporations,   and   any   community   chest,   fund,   or   foundation,   organized   and  
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not participate in, or 
intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public  office.”  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). 
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however, typically allow members to control the organization via voting,206 
and those members are the primary recipients of the benefits of the 
organization. I contend that mutual benefit organizations thus have a close 
equivalent to shareholders. The shareholder theory of corporate taxation 
with a strong ownership component and weak practical justification would 
suggest that tax exemption for mutual benefits is a subsidy. Thus, whereas 
the structure required of charitable organizations alone meets the 
shareholder rationale requirements, mutual benefit organizations do not. To 
justify exemption for mutual benefits we need a reason for providing a 
subsidy. 
To illustrate the argument regarding mutual benefits, consider a beer 
league, exempt from income tax because described under section 501 of the 
Code.207 A business league is formed specifically to promote the common 
interests of the organization’s members.208 The members pay dues and 
typically elect the board of directors and the directors in turn hire 
management to run the operations.209 The managers provide the services 
desired of the members as long as these are not particular services for 
individuals, such as providing insurance to the members.210 The beer league 
would most likely promote the business of selling beer, and would probably 
advocate to legislative and executive authorities for laws and enforcement 
of laws that are in the interest of the beer industry as a whole. Hansmann 
refers  to  such  an  organization  as  a  “commercial  mutual”  because  it derives 
its income from dues and it provides its services to the individuals who 
control the organization.211 
For simplicity, assume members pay $1 million in dues to the beer 
league during the year. The league invests the money while it is not using it 
and earns just $5000 in interest during the year. By the end of the year, it 
spends $1,005,000 on carrying out the interests of the members. The $5000 
is clearly earnings of the organization. Although the beer league does not 
distribute the   $5000   in   interest   as   a   “dividend,” the expenditure of this 
money on behalf of the members is the equivalent of a dividend in kind. 
 
 206 The members of a business league described under section 501(c)(6) generally vote 
for the directors of the organization. See, e.g., John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(6) 
Organizations, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 
K-1, K-10 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf. 
 207 I.R.C. §501(c)(6). 
 208 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960); see also FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. 
MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 14.3 (2012). 
 209 Reilly et al., supra note 206, at K-10. 
 210 I.R.C. § 501(c)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960). 
 211 See discussion supra Part II. 
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This dividend in kind goes untaxed both at the entity level and at the 
recipient level. 
Tax exemption allows beer distributors the right to establish a tax 
exempt vehicle for supporting their interests in the future. In comparison, a 
beer corporation will likely not sell its goods primarily to its shareholders. 
Nonetheless, its shareholders vote on a board of directors, that is, they have 
voting control, and they have a right to the earnings of the corporation. The 
biggest distinction is that the beer league member does not have a share she 
can sell. Yet the beer league member is not paying the price she might pay 
to purchase a share entitling her to transfer the interest in the future. She is 
paying the amount that will promote her interests currently and into some 
time in the future. This article argues that the shareholder theory of the 
corporate tax would require that the earnings of this beer league should bear 
a burden of tax, like its for-profit corporate counterpart. Individuals control 
the entity, receive its earnings, and defer what should be taxable gain. Thus 
tax exemption for an organization like this beer league is a subsidy that 
needs to be justified. 
The critical point is that there may be two different levels of tax 
exemption. The first is built upon the fact that there are no shareholders or 
“owners”  of  the  entity,  and  charitable  organizations  meet this first level of 
tax exemption. The latter must be built upon an argument that an 
organization is providing some underprovided good or service that society 
deems worthy of a subsidy. Whether a business league actually provides 
such services or goods is certainly open to question. 
Mutual benefits are much more likely to be benefitting wealthy 
interests. It is difficult to establish and run a nonprofit and doing so takes 
significant resources. Additionally, as discussed above, the potential 
benefits of exemption naturally accrue in greater amounts to those with 
significant resources. The tax benefit increases with greater income. 
Generally those with greater wealth earn greater incomes. Thus, the current 
regime likely increases the current growing income inequality and political 
voice inequality in the United States.212 
Perhaps responding to such basic concerns, in the late nineties, the 
Clinton administration proposed imposing the unrelated business income 
tax   on   a   business   league’s   net   investment   income.213 The idea was that 
“such   organization   should   be   subject   to   tax   on   earnings   attributable   to  
amounts collected in excess of the amounts needed to fund current 
 
 212 See Atkinson et al., supra note 186, at 3–71; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 168. 
 213 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 278–81 
(Comm. Print 1999). 
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operations   of   the   organization.”214 The proposal failed after a massive 
business league lobbying attack. The Chamber of Commerce claimed the 
plan  was   a   “stake   driven   at   the   very   heart   of   nonprofit   organizations.”215 
The shareholder theory of the corporate tax provides support for the 
adoption of this Clinton proposal. Most theorists who have considered tax 
exemption for mutual benefit organizations generally conclude that at least 
the investment income of these organizations should be taxed.216 Congress 
already applies an investment income tax and a tax on nonmember income 
from social clubs.217 It is time to at least apply an investment income tax on 
most mutual benefit organizations. 
Some argue for the exemption of income a mutual benefit earns from 
members while providing member services that each member could do on 
his own without being taxed.218 Bittker and Rahdert believe it generally 
impractical to collect what they expect would be a minute amount of 
income because the entities would simply zero out their income every 
year.219 They argue that we should consider any amount in excess of cost as 
simply an overcharge, and therefore not income at all.220 The shareholder 
theory provides little direction regarding such an argument. The shareholder 
theory as considered here simply suggests that to the extent individuals 
control an entity and tend to direct its benefits their way it should be taxed. 
This claim suggests that there is no income benefit at all on individuals who 
pool their resources to accomplish some group aim. 
Because tax exempt mutual benefits bear such a strong resemblance to 
cooperatives, we could consider taxing tax exempt mutual benefits under 
sub-chapter T of the Code.221 Under a cooperative regime, a corporate tax is 
applied at the entity level, but the cooperative is allowed a deduction for 
patronage dividends.222 The members of the cooperative pay tax on 
 
 214 Id. at 279. 
 215 Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton  Plan  to  Tax  Lobbyists’  Investment  Gains  Hits Home 
in a Fury of Faxes, Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24 (quoting Bruce 
Josten, Executive Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
 216 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3,   at   358   (“There   is   no   reason   to permit 
[investment and nonmember] income . . . to escape taxation when acquired under the 
umbrella  of  [a  mutual  benefit]  organization.”);;  see also Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, supra 
note 3, at 135 (concluding   “consumer mutuals generally ought to be taxed at least on . . . 
profits  from  dealing  with  nonmembers.”). 
 217 I.R.C. § 512(a)(3). 
 218 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305. 
 219 Id. at 357 (discussing this idea with respect to business leagues). 
 220 Id. at 348. 
 221 I.R.C. §§ 1381–88 
 222 I.R.C. §§ 1381–82. 
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patronage dividends they receive.223 This article focuses on the implications 
of the corporate tax, however, and will leave discussion of cooperative 
taxation for another article. Nevertheless, we may prefer maintaining tax 
exemption for mutual benefits that are used to impact the political process. 
Many of the most-consequential tax exempt mutual benefits such as 
business leagues, social welfare organizations, and labor organizations are 
used in this manner. Tax exemption likely allows the government more 
ability to demand public disclosure, and we may prefer public disclosure to 
any marginal benefit that we obtain from the revenue associated with 
member income. 
To conclude, the shareholder theory of the corporate income tax would 
only support tax on tax exempt organizations where those organizations 
have individuals akin to shareholders. The rules regarding charitable 
organizations when operating for charitable purposes appear to meet this 
requirement. Mutual benefit tax exempt organizations arguably do not. Yet, 
that is not the end of the analysis for either type of organization. As 
demonstrated by the corporate tax rationales, the corporate tax has more 
than one function. Other functions may provide an argument for or against 
the taxation of tax exempts. A lack of ownership alone also seems an 
insufficient criterion for tax exemption. Because of the potential for tax 
deferral mischief through a tax exempt entity, further precautions such as 
requiring some publicly useful purpose seem necessary. 
C.  Real Entity/Regulatory Function 
No tax exemption theory considers that the corporate tax serves a 
regulatory function. Yet, early proponents of the corporate tax intended for 
the corporate tax to regulate the increasingly ubiquitous and politically 
powerful corporation in the Progressive Era.224 Avi-Yonah makes the 
modern case that the corporate tax still regulates publicly traded 
corporations.225 Highlighting the separation of ownership and control found 
in a publicly traded corporation, Avi-Yonah argues that corporate managers 
control substantial sources of wealth226 and that taxation of large amounts 
of wealth is needed to limit the political power of wealth in a democracy.227 
The corporate tax provides that limiting function for publicly traded 
corporations.228 Avi-Yonah also argues that the corporate tax provides a 
 
 223 I.R.C. § 1385. 
 224 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 225 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1210. 
 226 Id. at 1210. 
 227 Id. at 1238–39. 
 228 Id. at 1243–44. 
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tool for the government to direct the actions of managers toward desired 
shareholder and public uses of resources.229 The Code imposes a regulatory 
regime on tax exempt organizations. That regime primarily consists of 
purpose requirements, prohibitions on self-dealing and politically related 
activity, and required public disclosure. This article is a call to examine the 
tradeoff in regulatory effects we make in moving an organization from 
taxable status to tax exempt status, substituting one regulatory regime for 
another. 
Tax exempt organizations necessarily exhibit the separation of 
ownership and control found in publicly traded entities.230 In other words, 
because of the nondistribution constraint, the managers who control a 
nonprofit organization do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects 
of their decisions. Many managers of tax exempt organizations also manage 
vast quantities of assets for the public benefit. The top ten charitable 
organizations held assets of between $10 and $40 billion as of 2009.231 If it 
is important in a democracy to limit the ability of a finite group of 
individuals to control significant amounts of wealth, and the corporate tax 
serves to limit this finite group, we should consider the impact of exempting 
nonprofit organizations from the corporate tax. Following the logic of the 
regulatory theory of the corporate tax, tax exempt organizations either need 
that regulation or should be regulated by some other regime. 
1. Managerial Nonprofit Corporation Power/Avi-Yonah’s  Limiting 
Function 
According to the limiting function of the regulatory theory we should 
tax entities where managers control an organization they do not own that 
has some quantum of wealth and income.232 The limiting function is 
necessary for a well-functioning democracy to prevent finite individuals 
from   amassing   too   much   power.   By   “limiting   power   in   a   democracy,”   I  
mean limiting the power to elect certain candidates (political campaign 
intervention), and to limit the power to influence our government actors 
once in place (lobbying). Is there a need for such a limiting function within 
 
 229 Whether the corporate tax directs resources to a good use is highly questionable, but 
the fact that the tax is imposed provides Congress such a tool through incentives and 
limitations on deductions. See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 180, at 14 (discussing its 
potential to aid in aligning managers with shareholder interests). 
 230 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 159. 
 231 See Largest Organizations, (NCCS Core 2010 Public Charities File), NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs.php?cat= 
ALL&amt=ass_eoy (last visited July 5, 2013). 
 232 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 1246–47. 
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the tax exempt sector? 
The corporate tax is not the only means to prevent the harm to a 
democracy from corporate managerial political power. Congress has 
attempted to limit or ban expenditures in the political sphere.233 Such 
limitations implicate freedom of speech and after Citizens United, however, 
where the Court held unconstitutional a federal ban on corporate 
independent   expenditures   on   “electioneering   communications”   or   for  
speech that expressly advocates for a candidate, such a strategy now seems 
out of the question.234 Congress sometimes requires disclosure and 
disclaimers.235 This type of regulation fared better under Citizens United.236 
The Court expressly stated, “[t]he   Government   may   regulate   corporate  
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may 
not  suppress  that  speech  altogether.”237 Congress has utilized each of these 
solutions to some degree in the Code for the tax exempt sector. 
A charitable organization is prohibited from engaging in lobbying as a 
substantial part of its activities.238 It is absolutely prohibited from 
intervening in a political campaign.239 Lobbying for charitable 
organizations involves a complex analysis but in general involves attempts 
to influence legislation,240 while intervening in a political campaign refers 
to publicly advocating for or against a candidate for public office.241 Under 
the Code, a tax applies to charitable organizations that engage in 
 
 233 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and 
Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 98 (2009) (discussing the history of the efforts of 
Congress to limit political campaign intervention expenditures). 
 234 Citizens  United  v.  Fed.  Election  Comm’n,  558  U.S.  310,  367 (2010). 
 235 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts (BCRA) disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements, BCRA §§ 201 and 311, 116 Stat. 88, 105, are examples of such efforts. See 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010) (discussing 
the potential for disclosure to have a useful impact on regulating the political process); see 
also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After 
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, 
Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax Exempt Entities 
Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. 
J.L. & POL’Y 59 (2011). 
 236 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50. 
 237 Id. at 319. 
 238 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008); see also I.R.C. § 501(h) and 
the regulations thereunder. 
 241 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 
2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
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disqualifying lobbying,242 and another tax applies if a charitable 
organization engages in political expenditures.243 Additionally, charitable 
organizations are required to make an annual disclosure on Form 990, 
Return of Organization Exempt from Tax.244 On this form, charities must 
disclose a substantial amount of information regarding their activities 
during the year including gross income, substantial donors, highest paid 
employees, and all sorts of confirmations that their organization has been in 
compliance with the requirements of section 501.245 
Because of this substantial regime limiting the political involvement of 
charities through a combination of prohibitions, limitations, taxes, and 
public disclosure, it appears Congress has thoroughly handled the limiting 
function portion of the regulatory function with respect to charitable 
organizations. It is hard to imagine that imposing the corporate tax would 
be needed for the limiting function on top of this regime. The one caution is 
that after Citizens United these limitations focused on prohibiting 
communication are in question.246 In Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Washington, the Court accepted congressional tax 
limitations on lobbying tax exempt organizations primarily because the 
Court viewed tax exemption as a subsidy.247 Ironically, the analysis of this 
article arguing that tax exemption is not a subsidy for charitable 
organizations, at least under a shareholder theory analysis, would take some 
weight away from the Regan decision. Congress, however, still may be 
subsidizing charitable organizations through the charitable contribution 
deduction.248 
 
 242 I.R.C. § 4912. 
 243 I.R.C. § 4955. 
 244 This information return is required by I.R.C. § 6033. 
 245 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). On the political campaign intervention prohibition, Part IV, 
question 3 of Form 990 asks, “Did   the   organization   engage   in   direct   or   indirect   political  
campaign   activities   on   behalf   of   or   in   opposition   to   candidates   for   public   office?”   On  
lobbying, Part IV, question 4 of Form 990 asks, “Did   the  organization  engage   in   lobbying  
activities,  or  have  a  section  501(h)  election  in  effect  during  the  tax  year?” 
 246 For articles considering the impact of Citizens United on the constitutionality of 
these types of limitations, see Aprill, supra note 3; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities 
and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407 
(2011). 
 247 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
There  is  some  thought  that  Justice  Blackmun’s  concurrence  in  Regan is equally as important. 
Justice Blackmun believed that the only thing that rescued the limitation on lobbying was the 
fact that a section 501(c)(3) organization could establish a section 501(c)(4) organization to 
lobby on its behalf. 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Aprill, supra note 3, 
at 5–6 (discussing the importance of Justice Blackmun’s concurrence). 
 248 See I.R.C. § 170. 
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Political limitations on mutual benefit organizations are much less 
substantial. For instance, social welfare organizations,249 labor 
organizations,250 and business leagues251 all may engage in lobbying as 
their sole activity, 252 and may also intervene in a political campaign as long 
as it is not the primary activity of the organization.253 To the extent a tax 
exempt organization engages in political intervention, a tax is imposed on 
the lesser of its investment income or the amount spent on political 
activity.254 It is possible though to avoid this tax by setting up a segregated 
fund for all funds to be used for politicking.255 An  organization  “organized  
and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting 
contributions or making expenditures or both . . . ” for political intervention 
is instead described in section 527 of the Code, assuming the organization 
follows the requirements of that section.256 Under section 527, an 
organization’s   income   from   political   contributions,   dues,   political   fund-
raising events or sales, and bingo games is exempt from taxation.257 A tax 
is applied generally on the net investment income, but it is apparently fairly 
easy to structure the organization so it pays little if any tax.258 Mutual 
benefit organizations must also file a Form 990 and disclose substantive 
information regarding their activities, although that form has a much more 
substantial focus on the activities of charitable organizations. 
Social welfare organizations are very often used to lobby and are 
attacked in the news for being engaged in too much political activity.259 
 
 249 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (1960). 
 250 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1 (1997). 
 251 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960). 
 252 See John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and 
Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, in INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., supra note 206, at L-1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicl03.pdf; see also Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117; Aprill, supra note 3, at 
375. 
 253 Petition from Democracy 21 and the Campaign Legal Center, to Douglas H. 
Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 27, 2010), available at http://www. 
democracy21.org/uploads/D21_and_CLC_Petition_to_IRS_7_27_2011.pdf (asking that the 
Service revise section 501(c)(4) regulations to state that a social welfare organization must 
operate  “exclusively”  for  social  welfare  purposes  rather  than  just  “primarily”). 
 254 I.R.C. § 527(f). 
 255 I.R.C. § 527(f)(3). 
 256 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
 257 I.R.C. § 527(e). 
 258 I.R.C. § 527(b); see Aprill, supra note 3, at 51. 
 259 For   instance,  Karl  Rove’s  Crossroads  GPS   is  notably  an  organization  described   in  
section 501(c)(4). ProPublica has invested significant resources looking at the use of social 
welfare organizations to influence the political process. See Kim Barker, Karl  Rove’s  Dark  
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Crossroads GPS, for instance, the social welfare organization Karl Rove 
helped form and lead, had spent $70.9 million on the 2012 federal elections 
as of December 7, 2012, mostly on behalf of Republican Party candidates 
and causes.260 The Planned Parenthood Action Fund, LLC, to include a 
Democratic leaning organization as well, spent over $6 million on the 2012 
federal elections.261 Business leagues also play a role in the political 
process. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for instance, spent over $33 
million on the 2012 federal elections.262 The Associated Builders and 
Contractors, Inc. spent $280,000 on the elections.263 
Given the separation of management and control and the substantial 
wealth of these organizations, the rationale for applying the limiting 
function of the corporate tax should apply to mutual benefit organizations. 
Additionally, the limitations on the political use of mutual benefits are not 
substantial in the way they are for charitable organizations. Thus, if you 
accept the need for the limiting function then either the certain additional 
limitations should be imposed on charitable organizations, or a tax should 
be placed on the income of these organizations. There are a number of 
proposals arguing for either greater disclosure or greater limitations on how 
much political activity in which these organizations engage.264 
 
Money Group Promised IRS It Would   Spend   ‘Limited’  Money   on   Elections, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 14, 2012, 11:19 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/what-karl-roves-dark-money-
nonprofit-told-the-irs. The money contributed to social welfare organizations for political 
purposes  has   come   to  be   referred   to   as   “dark  money”  because   these  organizations   are  not  
required to disclose the names of donors from whom they ultimately received their money. 
See Barker, supra note 6. 
 260 Al Shaw & Kim Barker, What and Where are the Super-PACs Spending?, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2012), http://projects.propublica.org/pactrack/#committee=all (last 
updated Dec. 7, 2012). 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 The DISCLOSE Act of 2012, sponsored by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, would 
amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for additional disclosure from 
corporations, labor unions, and other organizations when they make an “independent  
expenditure”   effectively   advocating   for   a   candidate.   See Democracy is Strengthened by 
Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2012, S.3369, 112th Cong. (2012); see also 
Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the 
Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011) (calling for disclosure of contributions to 
certain tax exempt organizations for political action on a rapid basis); Greg Colvin, A Silver 
Bullet that Would End Secret Tax Exempt Money in Elections, CAMPAIGN FOR ’AM.’S 
FUTURE BLOG (April 11, 2012), http://blog.ourfuture.org/20120411/A_Silver_Bullet_That 
_Would_End_Secret_Tax-Exempt_Money_in_Elections (proposing a cap on political 
intervention spending by any organization organized under section 501(c) of the lesser of 
$100,000 or 10% of expenditures). 
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Thus, ironically, a business that the corporate tax is supposed to 
regulate may put money aside in a mutual benefit organization, a tax-free 
vehicle, to defend its interests in the future. These membership dues are 
generally deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under 
section 162 of the Code. While not deductible if for political or lobbying 
purposes,265 the investments can grow tax free. Such a subsidy allowing 
special industries the ability to save tax free in the same way we allow 
individuals to save for retirement, health care expenses, or education seems 
questionable. It allows a larger business a greater subsidy based on greater 
return from greater assets and essentially entrenches long-term power for a 
larger industry. The limiting function of the corporate tax should be 
extended to these organizations. This is a good reason to reconsider at least 
the exemption on investment income from UBIT for organizations 
described in section 501(c)(6), and possibly, given their significant use 
these days for political purposes, organizations described in section 
501(c)(4).266 
2. Manager Incentive Alignment/Avi-Yonah’s  Incentive  Function 
The corporate income tax also serves an incentive function.267 This 
function provides Congress with a tool to direct managerial behavior in 
ways that will be beneficial to the shareholders of a company and to the 
general public. If the corporate tax indeed can incentivize managers to use 
resources in a manner more consistent with shareholders and the public, it 
would stand to reason that we should consider whether this is a better tool 
for regulating tax exempt entities as well. 
The Code imposes requirements on tax exempt organizations 
encouraging them to use their assets in ways that are in the interest of the 
organizations’   respective   constituents   and   the   public   at   large.   Charitable  
organizations must be organized and operated exclusively for a charitable 
purpose.268 Mutual benefit organizations likewise must generally operate 
exclusively or primarily for their particular exempt purpose.269 A social 
welfare organization, for instance, must operate exclusively for social 
 
 265 I.R.C. § 162(e). 
 266 Notably, we already impose this obligation on social clubs, and where a business 
league or social welfare organization extends its activities such that it is engaged directly in 
intervening in a political campaign on a primary basis, it becomes a political organization 
described in section 527 and is thereby subject to taxes on its net investment income. 
 267 See supra Part IV.F. 
 268 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 269 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6). 
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welfare purposes.270 With the charitable sector, the Service requires 
substantial disclosure about an organization on its Form 990 including some 
on the governance of the organization. The Service also expresses publicly 
that it believes part of its function is to regulate the governance of the 
sector.271 Charitable and social welfare organizations are subject to 
limitations   on   the   amount   of   “private   benefit”   they   can   provide   to  
individuals,272 and are also subject to a tax that effectively polices self-
dealing transactions.273 
Nevertheless, by exempting organizations from tax Congress gives up a 
tool in taxation to positively or negatively incentivize nonprofit 
organization managers towards certain behavior. With the current structure 
governing tax exempt  organizations,  Congress’s  almost  exclusive  tool  is  to  
penalize such organizations to try to encourage ideal managerial behavior. 
For instance, if a charitable organization fails to operate for an exempt 
purpose, the Service can revoke its exemption and make the organization 
subject to the income tax. A hospital that does not to comply with a 
charitable needs assessment requirement should theoretically lose its 
exemption.274 Congress has tried to alleviate this problem of revoking 
 
 270 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). 
 271 Sarah Hall Ingram, Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, Internal 
Revenue Service, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal 
Education: Nonprofit Governance  The View from the IRS (June 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ingram__gtown__governance_062309.pdf (“[T]he  IRS  has  a  
clear, unambiguous role to play in governance. Some have argued that we do not need to be 
involved, because we can count on the states to do their job and the sector to stay on the path 
of self-regulation. . . . we cannot delegate to others our obligation to enforce the conditions 
of  federal  tax  exemption.”). 
 272 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008)  (“An  organization  is  not  
organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision (i) 
of this subparagraph   unless   it   serves   a   public   rather   than   a   private   interest.”);;   see Am. 
Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989); Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 
47 (1966) (organization provided too much private benefit by maintaining a navigable 
waterway mostly for the private use of the homes fronting the waterway and thus was not 
operated primarily for a charitable purpose). For its application to social welfare 
organizations, see Vision Serv. Plan v. United States, 265 Fed. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(finding a vision services health maintenance organization not to be organized for social 
welfare because it “benefits [the organization]’s subscribers rather than the general welfare 
of the community.”); Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 
F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1973), (membership organization of plumbers that repaired potholes of 
streets only its members had an obligation to repair found to not be operated for a social 
welfare   purpose   because   “each   individual member receives far more in economic terms 
precisely to the extent he uses the restoration service.”). 
 273 I.R.C. § 4958. 
 274 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
HACKNEY.FORMATTED.5 9/9/2013  4:11 PM 
2013] What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption 149 
exemption as the primary penalty for missteps to allow the Service more 
flexibility in enforcing the requirements for tax exempt organizations. For 
instance, it enacted section 4958 to apply to the self-dealing acts of insiders 
of charitable and social welfare organizations. This provides a more 
modulated penalty and one that applies to malfeasors rather than the 
organization, but the Service still must enforce a penalty. 
Congress could consider revising exemption such that a tax applies 
unless the organization complies with a particular requirement. For 
instance, an organization might be required to pay an income tax unless it 
can demonstrate that it in fact accomplished exempt purposes during the 
year. This might look a bit like a payout requirement under section 4942 
that already applies to private foundations. Instead of pulling the exempt 
status of an organization that fails to meet the payout requirement, however, 
we could simply apply a tax on the organization. If the organization meets 
the required amount of expenditures on its charitable purposes in a future 
year, it would not owe a tax. 
Intuitively it seems harder to employ penalties upon managers to 
incentivize good behavior, rather than to use taxes with certain deductible 
and nondeductible expenses. Arguably, the nondeductibility of foreign 
bribes serves as a more immediate disincentive to engaging in bribery than 
trying to penalize a manager once caught. One could also consider making 
credits more available to exempt organizations in the way the small 
employer health insurance tax credit has been made available to exempt 
organizations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.275 The 
message here is that a choice to exempt organizations comes with a loss of 
power over these organizations in seeking out certain desirable behaviors. 
Some object to the federal government regulating both the for-profit 
and the nonprofit corporate sectors. Fishman, for instance, objects to the 
Service engaging in regulating the governance policies of charitable 
organizations.276 He contends that this is not within the bounds of the 
federal   government’s   authority.277 Others have considered the proper role 
of the different authorities, including asking whether there should be some 
other federal agency that regulates charitable organizations.278 Some have 
 
 275 I.R.C. § 45R; see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH CARE TAX 
CREDIT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: WHO GETS THE TAX CREDIT, http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
Small-Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-Questions-and-Answers:-Who-Gets-the-Tax-Credit 
(last updated Jan. 24, 2013) (explaining that the credit is available to tax exempt 
organizations). 
 276 Fishman, supra note 185. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id.; Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: 
Focus   on   Independent   Stakeholders   as   a   “Middle  Way”, 99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011); Lloyd 
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argued that even within the tax exempt sector there is less need for 
regulation of mutual benefits because the membership structures of those 
organizations should ensure proper operation.279 
Because there is already regulation of for-profit organizations 
effectively taking place within the Code as a result of the imposition of the 
income tax, considering the use of the income tax as a means for regulating 
tax exempt organizations with a bit more precision seems fully within 
Congress’s  power.  As  more  empirical  work  is  needed  to  determine  whether  
corporate tax regulatory efforts actually work, the same is needed for 
nonprofit organizations. Finally, while mutual benefit organizations may 
have membership structures that ensure a closer affinity to such 
organization’s   primary   constituents,   its   members, than perhaps one can 
achieve through a charitable organization management structure, we have 
no reason to think that somehow mutual benefits would not present the 
same agency issues that lead to a concern regarding managerial behavior in 
publicly traded corporations. The same separation of ownership and control 
exists leading to a challenging agent/principal problem. 
D.  Artificial Entity/Benefits Theory 
The artificial entity theory in its original form held that nonprofit 
corporations should be subject to the corporate income tax to pay for the 
benefit of operating in the corporate form. The modern version of this 
rationale, however, holds that the tax is imposed on publicly traded entities 
in exchange for their ability to sell equity on public markets.280 Thus, this 
theory does not support a tax on nonprofit organizations; nonprofits are 
absolutely prohibited from selling equity on a public market. If this is the 
main theory for applying a corporate income tax, which as noted before 
seems questionable, then there is no subsidy to tax exempt organizations. 
E.  Bank’s  Capital  Lock-in Theory 
This article excluded capital lock-in theory as an independent equity 
based rationale of the corporate income tax. Capital lock-in theory contends 
that our current corporate tax system exists because corporate managers did 
not want to be forced to distribute dividends. If Congress converted the 
 
Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010). 
 279 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of 
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 890 (2003). 
 280 Of course, this is not the way the tax is applied. It is applied on any organization 
organized as a C corp. that does not elect S corp. status. 
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corporate tax to a conduit system like a partnership tax, shareholders would 
place significant pressure on corporate managers to pay dividends so that 
the shareholders could pay the taxes on corporate income. This would harm 
the capital lock-in feature of a corporation and lead to a less efficient and 
powerful business. The theory assumes shareholders should be taxed and 
that the entity tax is imposed in lieu of imposing a conduit system. Except 
to the extent capital lock-in reinforces the shareholder theory as the basis of 
the corporate tax, this artifact of our corporate tax history appears mostly 
useless in considering tax exemption. 
Nonetheless, the behavior of corporate managers to uphold capital 
lock-in by maintaining a corporate tax system that many of its shareholders 
consider unfair could be instructive for the tax exempt sector. Nonprofit 
organizations are also typically corporations and they cannot distribute 
earnings. This is a capital lock-in policy that allows the tax exempt sector to 
grow without having to worry about paying out investors. Presumably a 
charity’s   distributions   should   be   for   its   charitable   purpose and, arguably, 
some in the charitable sector do not expend enough annually for that 
purpose.   Congress’s   imposition   of   payout   requirements   on   charitable  
organizations such as supporting organizations and private foundations 
suggests that Congress has been concerned about such behavior.281 Thus, it 
might be fruitful to consider whether the managers of exempt organizations 
have behaved like managers of for-profit corporations. 
F.  Place for Theories Regarding Exemption 
The contention of this article is fairly narrow. It argues simply that we 
must understand why we would tax tax exempt entities in order to 
understand what makes an organization tax exempt. In considering a 
number of limitations on tax exempt organizations, the Court placed great 
importance on the fact that exemption is a subsidy.282 Thus, shedding more 
light on whether we have a rationale for taxing these entities is important. 
The contributions of Hansmann and Weisbrod on government failure 
and market failure, respectively, are important insights that provide strong 
explanatory reasons for the existence of the sector and efficiency bases for 
exempting the sector.283 Both authors also support the absence of owners, 
 
 281 I.R.C. §§ 509(a), 4942. 
 282 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983); see also 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.  540,  544  (1997)  (“Both  tax  
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax 
system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the 
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”). 
 283 See supra Part II.B. 
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or “shareholders”   in   tax exempt organizations.284 Rather than focusing 
explicitly on any tax rationale, however, their rationale focuses primarily on 
the market, identifying these organizations as the most efficient provider of 
some good or service.285 This article contends that the tax rationale has an 
important role to play in the analysis of the question of ownership, and in 
assessing the potential importance of regulating the sector. Understanding 
why we would tax an organization to begin with has very specific 
implications for how exemption should be structured. As a review of 
corporate tax rationales demonstrates, there may be multiple rationales for 
the imposition of a corporate tax and each rationale causes us to think 
slightly differently about the meaning of “tax exemption.” 
The search for positive qualities of the charitable sector has been a 
useful endeavor. We have better vocabulary and political justifications for 
exempting charitable organizations as a result. Nevertheless, an obsessive 
focus on charitable organizations leaves out a whole realm of organizations 
that also have an important impact on our society and need a justification 
for their tax status. More tax scholarship is needed on the mutual benefit 
sector. The Tea Party scandal demands it. This article argues that many 
mutual benefits likely have members that are equivalent to shareholders and 
therefore should likely face some greater tax burden than they currently 
face. Additionally, because these organizations often manage significant 
sources of wealth, they could potentially benefit from the regulatory 
function of the corporate tax. We could benefit from a closer analysis of the 
mutual benefit sector to determine if it might behave in greater public 
interest with a tax on net investment income along with greater disclosure 
regarding their donors. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article considered the rationales for exempting nonprofit 
organizations from income tax by considering why we impose a corporate 
income tax in the first place. Because so many theories for the rationale for 
tax exemption rely on a premise that tax exemption is a subsidy, this article 
asserts that we must have a legitimate basis for calling tax exemption a 
subsidy. In order to call it a subsidy we must have a rationale for why we 
would impose an income tax on these nonprofit organizations in the first 
place. Two reasons stand out: (1) to tax shareholders, and (2) to regulate 
corporate managers. Adopting the shareholder theory suggests that if an 
 
 284 See supra Part II.B. For both Weisbrod and Hansmann, the nondistribution 
constraint is critical to these organizations efficient functioning within our 
governmental/market system. 
 285 See supra Part II.B. 
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organization has individuals who have significant attributes of ownership 
similar to a shareholder, we have a strong rationale to impose an entity tax 
on that organization. Thus, we could conclude under this rationale that tax 
exemption for charitable organizations, which have no individuals 
resembling shareholders, is not a subsidy; however, tax exemption for 
mutual benefit organizations, which have individuals that resemble 
shareholders, is in fact a subsidy. Because there are only tepid rationales 
providing a basis for a subsidy to such mutual benefit organizations, this 
article contends we should reconsider tax exemption for mutual benefits. At 
the very least, we should tax their net investment income, as has been 
proposed for business leagues in the past and as we already apply to tax 
exempt social clubs. Such a move might be a means to take some of the 
pressure off the Service in making a call as to whether one of these mutual 
benefit organizations is too political. Adopting the regulatory theory 
suggests that when we choose to exempt nonprofit organizations we must 
recognize the loss of the two regulatory functions of the corporate tax: the 
limiting function, and incentive function. Substantial disclosure 
requirements and limitations on the political activity of charitable 
organizations make the corporate tax as regulatory device unnecessary as to 
charitable organizations. Yet the same cannot be said for mutual benefit 
organizations. The corporate regulatory tax rationale thus offer another 
reason to reconsider the current tax exempt structure for mutual benefits. 
 
